



Trade Shocks and Firms Hiring Decisions:
Citation for published version (APA):
He, C., Mau, K., & Xu, M. (2021). Trade Shocks and Firms Hiring Decisions: Evidence from Vacancy
Postings of Chinese Firms in the Trade War. Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and
Economics. GSBE Research Memoranda No. 001 https://doi.org/10.26481/umagsb.2021001





Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.




Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Feb. 2021
 
Chuan He, Karsten Mau, Minghzi Xu 
 
Trade Shocks and Firms Hiring 
Decisions: Evidence from 
Vacancy Postings of Chinese 



















Trade Shocks and Firms Hiring Decisions:
Evidence from Vacancy Postings of Chinese Firms
in the Trade War*
Chuan He













This paper studies the hiring behavior of firms exposed to the recent China-US
trade war. Our analysis leverages information from a Chinese online job board and a
firm-level measure of tariff exposure obtained from customs transactions data. Firms
that are more exposed to US tariffs on Chinese goods responded by posting fewer job
vacancies and offering lower wages. The latter is partly balanced out by increased
non-wage compensation. We also find a negative relationship between US-tariff ex-
posure and the educational background required in firms’ job ads. China’s retaliatory
tariffs against the US does not appear to have a statistically significant systematic im-
pact on hiring. The paper also reports heterogeneous adjustment patterns across firms
of different size, ownership and product mix. Overall, the trade war reveals to have
negative impact on firms and job-seekers in China.
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1 Introduction
The recent escalation of the US-China trade war resulted in a substantial disruption of
trade between the two countries. US imports from China hit a 5-year low in 2019, ranging
about 33bn US dollars below their value from 2015. US exports to China were about 9.5bn
dollars below 2015-levels. Comparing shipments in 2016-2017 to the years 2018-2019, US
imports from China decreased by 14-23 percent, while US shipments to China decreased
by 15-27 percent.1
Disruptions are not limited to aggregate trade flows. While exposed exporting firms
have to cope with an artificial increase in the price of their sold products, importers have
to pay more for their purchases or find new suppliers. Both see their competitiveness
eroding and lower sales and profits force them to re-optimize their cost structure and
investment decisions, including their labor demand.
In this paper, we use newly collected information from online job-vacancy postings in
China to document firm-level reactions to the trade war reflected in labor demand. By
observing information on the number and content of online job ads between May and
November 2019, we capture the most recent round of US tariff increases and Chinese
retaliation. This enables us to evaluate responses to the trade war at an early stage of
firms’ hiring process along several dimensions. Our results provide novel insights into
the propagation of short-term responses by firms to adverse trade policy shocks.
An important feature of the trade war is that the introduction of new tariffs did not
follow a rule-based rationale in the context of conventional WTO anti-dumping or safe-
guarding regulations. In fact, the US administration first based tariffs on national security
interests, but later raised tariffs on goods even if they were not currently imported from
China (Bown and Kolb, 2019; Handley et al., 2020a). This constitutes a credible setup for
a key identifying assumption: that Chinese firms had no influence on the timing, magni-
tude and coverage of the tariffs. Moreover, the magnitude and product coverage of the
additional (discriminatory) tariffs has been unseen for decades, which enables us to study
a policy experiment that is unique in contemporary economic history.
Indeed, the theoretical linkages between tariffs and firms’ hiring behavior can be man-
ifold and predicted outcomes are potentially ambiguous. Some intuition can be derived
from trade models with heterogeneous firms and imperfect product-market competition
(Melitz, 2003; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008; Melitz and Trefler, 2012). Depending on mod-
1Calculations use monthly trade statistics reported by the US International Trade Commission (USITC),
where trade values are reported in current prices and exclude any costs of surcharges or tariffs. Calculated
percentage reductions depend on the assumed underlying trend in aggregate bilateral trade. Figure B.1
visualizes these numbers.
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eling assumptions and initial product-market conditions, tariffs are either fully or partly
passed through to customers, while lower profits follow in both cases. With (partial) pass-
through and downward-sloping demand, exporters face lower sales, downscale their pro-
duction, and might eventually demand less labor. Moreover, (partial) absorption of a
tariff-induced price increase might result in lower salary offers by firms, as they seek to
preserve market access (and restore profit margins) through lowering their factor costs.2
Adjustments by firms facing new tariffs on their imports after Chinese retaliation are
more difficult to predict. On the one hand, firms sourcing intermediate inputs from the
US might switch to alternative (second best) suppliers, which potentially undermines
their competitiveness vis-à-vis less exposed firms (e.g., Handley et al., 2020b). Fewer job
postings could reflect an ensuing decline in labor demand. On the other hand, instead
of switching suppliers, exposed firms could manufacture the tariffed inputs themselves
and hire additional workers.3 This is reminiscent of the rationale proclaimed by the US
administration when it imposed additional tariffs on Chinese goods: higher tariffs might
boost domestic production and employment through import substitution.
At least two elements complicate such reasoning. First, the US-China trade war has
created substantial economic uncertainty among Chinese firms (Benguria et al., 2020).
While selection, timing, and magnitude of additional tariffs did not follow any rule-based
mechanism, also their duration is unknown. Second, job vacancy postings signal firms’
willingness to invest now into their future workforce. With the future being uncertain,
such investments might be delayed, so that a positive employment effect becomes less
likely to materialize in the short run (Bloom et al., 2007; Stein and Stone, 2013; Ghosal
and Ye, 2015). Further complicating elements relate to the characteristics of the Chinese
labor market itself. Depending on the intensity at which firms compete for qualified staff,
there might be more or less room for adjustments in published salary offers. Similarly,
formal and informal labor market institutions that determine the costs of hiring, firing
and delayed hiring might influence firms’ adjustments.
Against this background, we present reduced-form evidence on the effects of tariffs
on firms’ labor demand, as reflected by their publicly posted hiring announcements via
2A recent article in The Wall Street Journal (WSJ, 2020) reports that Chinese toy manufacturers respond
to additional US tariffs by using cheaper (and lower quality) inputs. Similar cost-saving adjustments could
occur via offered wages. More systematic evidence from Cavallo et al. (2019) suggests that additional US
tariffs faced by (Chinese) exporters are almost entirely passed through, while importing retailers partly
absorb them at the expense of lower margins. In turn, US exporters facing retaliatory tariffs tend to lower
their prices.
3Hummels et al. (2018) identify such “make-or-buy decisions” as one key element of offshoring (or re-
shoring in the present case), which depends on the relative costs of sourcing. An ad-hoc switch to in-house
production might also be realistic for firms that already produce certain varieties of their imported goods
(Bernard et al., 2020).
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a major Chinese job-portal. A main advantage of using online job advertisements is their
rich information that is typically not observable in firm-level census or survey data. This
includes, for instance, the number of open positions and their change over time, as well
as the average wage offered for a particular job. Besides this, we are able to observe
different forms of non-wage compensation (such as bonuses, subsidies and insurance
packages) as well as specifications of job prerequisites (e.g., previous working experience
or educational background). Our identification strategy relies on a firm-specific measure
of exposure to the trade war, which we construct based on pre-trade war information
about firms’ product mix and trade partners in a matched firm-level customs data set.
Our panel regression results suggest that firms exposed to higher US tariffs responded
by posting systematically fewer job ads. The reduction amounts to about 2.4-3.2 percent
for an average firm, which adds up to about 5,600 fewer job postings in total. A negative
impact is also found for the average wage compensation indicated in the job ads. Our
estimated 0.5 percent decrease corresponds to about $70 lower earnings per year in an
average job offer. Such reductions appear to be balanced out partly by other forms of
compensation, such as bonuses. This might suggest that firms shift towards more flexible
and performance-based compensation schemes as they face higher US tariffs. Moreover,
we find a robust and negative relationship between US-tariff exposure and the required
educational background, while requirements on previous job experience do not show
any statistically significant response. The reduction in educational-background require-
ments might reflect that US tariffs disproportionately targeted relatively skill-intensive
products.4
In contrast to these findings, we do not detect any comparable systematic adjustments
to China’s retaliatory tariffs on US products. While the sign of the corresponding coef-
ficient tends to be the opposite of that for US tariffs, their magnitude and precision are
substantially lower. This is similar to findings of related studies in the US, where import
tariffs fail to create new jobs or boost manufacturing sector performance (e.g. Goswami,
2020; Flaaen and Pierce, 2020). In fact, any notable producer gains seem to be either offset
by costlier imported inputs, or by the recent (and potentially temporary) nature of these
tariffs that prevents firms from investing into new jobs quickly.5 Our main findings are
maintained after submitting our results to a number of robustness checks, although we
4This interpretation is in line with Atkin (2016); Blanchard and Olney (2017) and also with the notion that
US tariffs disproportionately targeted intermediate inputs (Handley et al., 2020a). A reduction in educa-
tional background requirements could also be the result of changing organizational hierarchies in exposed
firms (Caliendo et al., 2020): establishments facing a negative demand shock reduce the relative size of their
management layer.
5This is in line with theories on firms’ investment behavior under policy uncertainty, considering a
significant option value of waiting (e.g. Handley, 2014; Handley and Limão, 2015).
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document some differential responses across firms of different size, ownership, or prod-
uct mix.
Overall, the US-China trade war appears to hurt both firms and job-seekers, creating
losers on both sides. This conclusion is in line and complementary to existing studies on
the trade war, which focus primarily on the US economy (Fajgelbaum et al., 2020; Amiti
et al., 2019, 2020; Flaaen and Pierce, 2020; Handley et al., 2020a; Waugh, 2019; Goswami,
2020) or on trade and investment effects in third countries (Meinen et al., 2019; Egger
and Zhu, 2019). We add to this literature by shedding light on the experience of Chinese
importers and exporters during this episode of political escalation.
Our reduced-form evidence provides novel insights on short-term labor-market ef-
fects of the trade war. In contrast to the related studies for the US, we do not rely on
regional administrative data, but uncover another layer by observing adjustments in the
number and content of vacancy postings over time. Our findings are also similar to Ja-
vorcik et al. (2019), who report decreasing online-hiring activity in the UK after the Brexit
referendum, due to increased trade policy uncertainty. While their approach relies on dif-
ferential industry-sector and regional exposure to a major trade-policy shock, we explic-
itly control for aggregate variation along these dimensions to document similar and more
nuanced adjustments within firms. Our findings corroborate evidence on the adverse ef-
fects of international political disintegration and uncertainty on economic activity.
By using newly collected data from a Chinese job board, our study also contributes
to a growing literature which uses online vacancy postings to analyze and compare labor
market dynamics in different countries. We introduce and describe this data in detail
in Section 2, along with the sample used to carry out the analysis of the present paper.
In Section 3, we provide additional background information on key events of the trade
war, which are relevant for our identification. Section 4 explains our empirical strategy to
identify the impact of tariffs on labor demand. Section 5 presents our results, including
robustness checks and an exploration of heterogeneous responses across firms. Section 6
concludes.
2 Online job-vacancy data
We join a growing literature that uses job vacancy data to understand a variety of issues
related to the labor market. Since the early study of Kuhn and Skuterud (2004), several
papers exploit such information to study, among others, the relationship between firm
performance and skill demand (Deming and Kahn, 2018; Kahn and Hershbein, 2018),
firm’s financial health and its recruiting outcomes (Brown and Matsa, 2016), as well as
4
other demand-side features, such as gender discrimination (Kuhn and Shen, 2013), search
effort and search duration (Faberman and Kudlyak, 2016), or labor market concentration
for specific types of jobs (Azar et al., 2018). While most job-vacancy datasets stem from
English job-ad platforms,6 Kuhn and Shen (2013) are an exception by using vacancy data
from the Chinese recruitment website Zhaopin.com. Our data is similar to theirs, but has
broader coverage and overall greater resemblance with China’s cross-regional and sec-
toral employment patterns reported in administrative data, as we outline below.
2.1 Data source and collection
Our data comes from Qian Cheng Wu You 51job.com (hereafter, 51job.com), a leading com-
pany for recruiting and human resource services in China. According to its recent annual
reports, the platform mainly targets (early career) white-collar workers in a wide range
of job categories. Since the launch of the platform in 1999, the company counts about 150
million registered job-seekers and estimates that, today, almost 500,000 unique employers
use their online recruiting services every year.7
We are interested in the publicly available information provided to job-seekers via on-
line vacancy postings at 51job.com, which comes in a standardized format as shown in
Figure A.1(a). Information states offered salary and non-wage compensation, job require-
ments regarding educational background, working experience, language and computer
skills, a detailed job description with keywords, and the working location. Because job
ads are linked to a firm’s page, we also have basic information on the firm characteristics,
such as ownership, scale of employment, and main industry. This information allows us
investigate labor demand along several dimensions while controlling for factors reflect-
ing unobserved characteristics of a location, industry, or firm. Via a unique URL-based
vacancy-identifier (see panel (b) of Figure A.1), we can track hiring activity of over time.
We collected information systematically since May 2019 to construct a dataset with
monthly frequency covering the period through November 2019. To obtain an as com-
plete as possible record of job-postings, we collected information several times per month
and deleted duplicates thereafter to avoid double-counting (see Section A.2 in our Data
Appendix). This procedure resulted in 1.7-2.7 million distinct job vacancies per month,
6Examples are Craiglist (Kuhn and Skuterud, 2004), the Job Openings and Labor Market Turnover
(JOLTS) survey from the BLS (Davis et al., 2012, 2013), Burning Glass (Kahn and Hershbein, 2018; Dem-
ing and Kahn, 2018; Javorcik et al., 2019), indeed.com (Mamertino and Sinclair, 2016; Turrell et al., 2019),
CareerBuilder.com (Brown and Matsa, 2016; Marinescu, 2017), and Snagajob.com (Faberman and Kudlyak,
2016).
7Numbers presented for the years 2016-2018 range between 460,000 and 520,000 (see https://ir.
51job.com/ir/doc/2019/2018Form20FEDGARFINAL20190329.pdf, page 28).
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from 297 prefecture cities in 31 Chinese provinces.8 We can further distinguish about 60
different industry sectors. Since tariffs are applied only on imports of physical products,
we will mainly focus on job postings from a subset of these industries and neglect po-
tential indirect effects through upstream or downstream propagation of the tariff shock.
Overall, both manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries reveal a similar down-
ward trend in their number of job postings towards the end of the year (see Figure A.3).
2.2 Representativeness of the data
In Figure 1 we illustrate the geographic coverage of our data on a map indicating the city-
level administrative division. The relatively few and sometimes missing observations
appear mostly in China’s sparsely populated regions, while most of the revealed hiring
activity takes place in Central and Eastern China. Indeed, the average incidence rate of
unique job vacancy postings per month is highly correlated with city-level employment
and GDP figures, as we show in Appendix Figure A.4.
Figure 1: Geographic coverage and concentration of job vacancies, full sample
Top3 − (193,469 ; 202,000]
Q4 − (2,040 ; 193,469]
Q3 − (779 ; 2,040]
Q2 − (395 ; 779]
Q1 − (0 ; 395]
No Data
Note: Authors’ calculations based on data downloaded from 51job.com between May and November 2019.
Figure shows coverage and concentration of average monthly number of observed vacancies across 297 out
of 343 perfecture-level cities. Intervals depict quartiles.
Despite broad geographic coverage, online job-vacancy data comes at the expense of
8We refer to cities as the second layer of administrative division in China. The 31 provinces denote the
first layer, which include four centrally-administrated municipalities (Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai and
Tianjin) and five autonomous regions (Guanxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Xinjiang, and Tibet).
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potential limitations in their representativeness for the labor market. As discussed in re-
lated research, entry- and high-turnover jobs are likely to be over-represented and job ads
posted online tend to require a higher educational background than traditional job boards
(Davis et al., 2013; Kuhn and Shen, 2013; Kahn and Hershbein, 2018). By targeting young
white-collar workers, 51job.com seems to share such characteristics. Examining the dis-
tribution of educational backgrounds in Figure A.5, we observe that more than 70 percent
of the advertised jobs require college education as a minimum. While this is less than
the 87 percent reported by Kuhn and Shen (2013, Table I), who used online job ads from
Zhaopin.com in 2008-10, the China Population Census from 2015 and previous editions
suggest a much lower share of 30 percent or less. Differences between searched skills in
our data and matched skills in the Census data may explain part of this discrepancy, but,
nevertheless, vacancies posted at 51job.com seem to disproportionately target higher skill
segments of the labor market.
Regarding coverage and patterns across industries, we compare job postings to sec-
toral employment and firm populations.9 Figure A.6(a) shows the number of jobs across
industries, reflecting occupied jobs (i.e. employment) in the Census and job vacancies in
our sample. The most salient group — manufacturing — coincides in both data sets,
counting 45-50 percent of the jobs. The second and third largest numbers in our va-
cancy data belong to the health/pharmaceutical sector and to IT services. Neither of
them stands out in the census data. Panel (b) of Figure A.6 presents the industry distribu-
tion of hiring firms. Again, the manufacturing sector dominates in both data sets while
energy, health, real estate, and IT services follow in the vacancy data. In contrast to this,
the census data prominently features public managements jobs and firms, which is not
covered in our data. As in Kuhn and Shen (2013, Table A.1), online job ads appear to be
skewed towards the private sector.10
2.3 Data sample
For our empirical analysis, we constrain our sample to firms that are directly involved in
international trade, for reasons we explain in greater detail below. We use the company
9We use the most recent offical census data sets: the China Population Census 2015 and the China Eco-
nomic Census 2018. More information can be found at National Bureau of Statistics of China. Different levels
of sector and industry disaggregation complicate comparison of job-vacancy data with Census statistics and
could lead to potential inaccuracies of this assessment. Numerical values should therefore be interpreted
in orders of magnitude rather than precise values or cutoffs.
10See Table A.3 for further comparisons of our data to the information from the Zhaopin.com sample used
in Kuhn and Shen (2013), and the selected urban census population from China’s eight highest-income
provinces summarized by the same authors.
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name stated on 51job.com to find matching records in Chinese Customs statistics and ob-
tain a sample of 30,123 firms which posted 607,532 different vacancies during the period
from May through November 2019.11
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Job Vacancies from firms matched to customs data
Panel A. Job vacancy characteristics Mean Std.Dev.




Non-wage compensation (share of vacancies)
Subsidies 0.56 0.50
Bonus 0.49 0.50
Insurance package 0.71 0.45
Job requirements
Average work experience (years) 1.76 1.99
Minimum 1.58 1.71
Maximum 1.95 2.28
College degree or higher (fraction of jobs) 0.77 0.42






Small (≤ 50 empl.) 5.8 19.0
Medium-small (50-500 empl.) 39.5 53.8
Medium-large (500-5,000 empl.) 39.6 22.8
Large (>5,000 empl.) 12.8 2.9
Number of unique jobs 607,532
Number of firms 30,123
Note: Author’s calculations based on data collected from 51job.com. Summary statistics for sample of firms
matched with China Customs information, May-November 2019. Reported percentages in Panel B might
not add up to 100, because some firms did not report this information.
Table 1 presents summary statistics of our sample, where the average annual wage
offer ranges around 100,000 RMB. This corresponds to about 14,500 US dollars per year,
which is above China’s average income per capita.12 Many of the vacancies offer some
form of non-wage compensation, such as subsidies and bonus payments. Over 70% of the
11As company names might be spelled differently across data sets, we require a similarity score of at least
75 percent to qualify as a match. On average firms in our final sample score close to 90 percent.
12GDP per capita for 2018-19 ranged just below 10,000 US dollars, which confirms that vacancies posted
at 51job.com represent relatively better-paying jobs.
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vacancies provide a package of five insurances and housing compensation as additional
welfare benefits for employees.13 In terms of job requirements, 77% of the vacancies re-
quire a college degree as a minimum, while the bar of working experience is set at 1.76
years on average (i.e., one year and 9 months). Panel B of Table 1 presents firm character-
istics. We observe that privately owned domestic firms dominate the sample, followed by
foreign-owned (and invested) enterprises and state-owned firms (SOEs).14 Distinguishing
firm scales indicates that large firms account for more than half of the job postings in our
sample, while they represent only about 25 percent of the firms. Overall, medium-sized
firms dominate, even though the very large and very small firms also provide meaningful
numbers of observations.
We present further summary statistics in Appendix B. Figure B.2 depicts the geo-
graphic coverage of our matched sample, indicating the concentration of job ads as well
as average wage levels. Not surprisingly, high-paying job offers concentrate in China’s
coastal provinces, besides some exceptions. In contrast to the overall sample, the number
of vacancies for matched firms appears to be relatively higher the inner-land regions. An
explanation could be that modern China has moved its labor-intensive manufacturing
base into inner Chinese regions (Mau and Xu, 2019), whereas higher-paid jobs are offered
in other, more knowledge-intensive sectors outside of our sample. In terms of sectoral
coverage, we continue to observe a wide range of industries, but further concentration on
manufacturing. Table B.1 shows that the top ten industries account for about two thirds
of the observed job ads and firms in our sample and contain only one non-manufacturing
sector: “Trade / Import and Export”.15 Monthly summary statistics for the number and
key-attributes of the sampled job vacancies are shown in Table B.2. They indicate a grad-
ual decline in hiring activity over time (including fewer firms posting job ads), but fairly
stable compensation offers and job requirements on average.
In the following sections we describe how we exploit this data to infer the effects of
the trade war in firms’ hiring activity.
13Five insurances include unemployment insurance, endowment insurance, medical insurance, work-
related injury insurance, and maternity insurance. Detailed descriptions are presented in Table B.4
14Comparing the respective percentages for jobs and firms further reveals that foreign-owned firms post
relatively fewer job ads via this platform on average than Chinese firms.
15See Table B.6 for a full list of industries.
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3 The US-China trade war
3.1 Stages of escalation
Since 2018, the US administration under President Trump implemented protectionist trade
policies in several rounds using various justifications. In a first round, in February 2018,
global safeguard tariffs were applied on imports of washing machines and solar pan-
els. These were followed by tariffs on steel and aluminum in March 2018, justified with
national security concerns. The new tariffs affected major US trading partners, who re-
sponded with retaliatory tariffs whenever they saw violations of WTO law (Bown and
Kolb, 2019; Fajgelbaum et al., 2020).
Next to these multilateral tariffs, China became a main target of US trade policy fol-
lowing investigations on the abuse of US companies’ intellectual property rights and
other allegations. Since then, the US government imposed additional tariffs on Chinese
products in three rounds in early July, late August and late September 2018. A fourth
round followed at the beginning of May 2019, which increased tariffs further on goods
that were already targeted in the third round (China III). China retaliated by imposing
own tariffs on US products, as shown in Figure 2. The additional bilateral tariffs contrast
strongly with the average MFN tariffs the two countries apply on imports from most of
its trade partners, in line with WTO guidelines.16
Next to their magnitude, tariffs were applied also to a broad range of products. The
first major rounds of US tariffs on China became effective on July 06th and August 23rd,
2018, and targeted 891 and 244 product categories specified according to the 8-digit Har-
monized Tariff Schedule (HTS), respectively, with an additional 25% increase on the existing
rates. China’s retaliation to these first rounds targeted an equivalent value of US goods
and covered 184 and 173 products, respectively, with an extra 25% rate.17 On September
24th, 2018, the US applied another 15% tariff rate on 4,626 products valuing about $200
billion in imports. China’s response entailed a simultaneous tariff increase by 5 and 10
percentage points targeting 4,062 US products worth about $60 billion in imports. At the
same time, the US administration announced to increase tariffs on the same goods by
another 25 percentage points at a later stage and China announced to do the same. In
fact, following a meeting in December 2018, the governments agreed to postpone these
measures, and China eliminated some of its retaliatory tariffs on US cars and car parts in
16We do not exploit MFN tariffs in our empirical analysis, but display this information for illustrative
purposes and assume that the majority of trade flows are subject to those (stable and predictable) rates.
17Earlier, in April 2018, China had imposed tariffs on 87 products amounting to $2.4 billion in imports
from the US, responding to the steel and aluminum tariffs it had imposed on several of its trade partners.
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Note: Authors’ calculations based on data from Fajgelbaum et al. (2020), Li (2018), and own updates. Tariffs
denote monthly averages computed from 8-digit Harmonized Tariff Schedules (HTS). Timing determined
based on whether effective dates fell into first or second half of a month. R1-R4 indicate rounds of Chinese
retaliation. Shaded areas indicate the observations period in our job-vacancy data (Section 2).
early 2019. However, another stage of the escalation followed in May 2019, when the US
applied the previously announced additional tariffs. China followed a month later.
Despite ongoing threats over the months that followed, no further tariffs had been
imposed since then. In December 2019, the two parties announced a so-called “Phase-one
Deal” in which China committed to purchasing major amounts of US products, while
leaving unchanged all other measures taken before. The agreement was signed in mid-
January 2020 and came into effect a month later. As our sample with monthly job-vacancy
data begins in May 2019, our analysis will focus on the last round of tariff increases,
which are denoted by “China IV” and “R4” in Figure 2. At that stage the US had applied
additional tariffs on almost 75 percent of the 8,225 products that are defined in the HTS.
3.2 Potential effects on firms’ hiring behavior
Empirical research on the US-China trade war documents an abrupt and major impact of
the tariffs on export revenues of the two countries (e.g. Fajgelbaum et al., 2020; Meinen
et al., 2019). While Chinese exporters can theoretically pass on the tariffs to their US
customers, it might be rational to absorb (at least some of) the burden to avoid excessive
reductions in sales. To absorb the tariff burden, firms have to lower their “factory gate”
prices, which can be achieved by lowering mark-ups or unit production costs. Regardless
of which strategy a firm adopts, employees are likely to suffer. Lower sales translate into
11
lower labor demand. Charging a lower price per unit sold might exert pressure on wages.
Our data does not allow us to trace adjustments for firms’ existing employees. How-
ever, we do observe requested characteristics of firms’ potential future employees. Given
lower sales and the economic and political uncertainty surrounding the trade war, we
expect that the number of job vacancies posted by firms facing additional US tariffs will
decline (Handley, 2014; Handley and Limão, 2015; Benguria et al., 2020). We might also
expect adjustments in the advertised compensation, if local labor market conditions allow
for it. However, if wage offers decrease too much firms risk deterring good candidates.
Reductions in the offered wage compensation may therefore require an increase in alter-
native forms of compensation, such as bonuses, subsidies or insurances.
Predicting adjustments in skill-requirements, such as education and previous work
experience is more difficult. Skill demand might depend on firms’ efforts of shifting sales
towards products that are less exposed to US tariffs (Atkin, 2016; Blanchard and Olney,
2017). If such a strategy is relevant, we might observe relatively lower skill-requirements
(e.g. educational background) in our job ads, as products shipped to the US belong to
the most skill-intensive goods in China’s exports (see Figure B.3 and B.4). An alternative
channel could be that exposed firms respond to lower sales and cost pressure by seeking
workers willing to accept lower wages. This might lead firms to request lower minimum
standards in work experience and educational background in their job vacancies.
Since the trade-war involved reciprocally applied tariffs, Chinese firms might also be
affected by the retaliation of their own government. These might theoretically protect
some firms from external US competition, but it is questionable that this gives sufficient
incentives for adjustments in labor demand and compensation offers. Given their ad-hoc
nature, firms risk being exposed to a sudden removal of these tariffs, which would leave
them with too many employees and potential separation costs adding to their earlier
hiring costs. Indeed, related studies on the US labor market adjustments fail to provide
any evidence of increased hiring and employment in protected industries and regions
during this episode (Waugh, 2019; Goswami, 2020; Flaaen and Pierce, 2020).
Finally, since the goods China imports from the US might be important intermediate
inputs, retaliatory tariffs might actually hurt importing firms or retailers as their supply-
chains are disrupted.18 Again, it is unclear how firms would respond: producing in-
house and hire more; substitute import source and stay as before; or scale down and
hire less. Derived adjustments in labor demand appear to depend critically on specific
assumptions, so we intend to answer these questions empirically but remain skeptical
18Handley et al. (2020a) and Flaaen and Pierce (2020) find negative effects of such supply-chain disrup-
tions on US firm and export performance.
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regarding major increases in hiring activity after Chinese retaliation.
4 Empirical framework
4.1 Firm-level exposure to the trade war
4.1.1 Measurement and identification
We construct two measures of firm-level exposure to additional tariffs and discuss their
interpretation. The first measure captures exposure to US tariffs, which mainly affects
exporters. The second measure captures exposure to China’s retaliatory tariffs on US
products and mainly affects importers.












where τUSjt is good j’s ad valorem tariff imposed by the US at time (i.e. month) t, XUSfj0 is
firm f ’s exports of good j to the US in a pre-sample base-period t = 0 (i.e. 2016), which
we divide by firms’ total export revenues from good j, as indicated in the denominator.
Jef is the set of goods exported by firm f . By interacting the US tariff rate with a measure
of the relative importance of the US market for each exporter, we obtain our measure of
exposure as a weighted average of the US tariff rate faced by firm f .
Likewise, based on China’s retaliation tariffs on US goods and firms’ imports data, we












where τCHNjt is good j’s ad valorem tariff imposed by China on the US goods at time t (i.e.
month), MUSfj0 is firm f ’s average imports of good j from the US in a pre-sample base-
period t = 0 (i.e. 2016), which we divide by firms’ total imports of good j, as indicated in
the denominator. Jmf is the set of goods imported by firm f . By interacting the Chinese
tariff rate on US products with a measure of their relative importance for each importer,
we obtain our firm-level measure of exposure to import tariffs.
Since we can directly observe US and Chinese applied tariffs, as well as firms’ relative
“specialization” in US trade relations, our measure denotes an accurate quantification
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of tariff exposure. Indeed, our approach is similar to related research that studied the
impact of the trade war on local US labor markets (e.g. Waugh, 2019; Goswami, 2020).
Furthermore, by employing customs data from 2016 to construct our pre-period weights,
we are able to address endogeneity concerns that could potentially bias our estimates.19
However, we also face one caveat for identification, as our pre-sample period weight does
not take into account firms’ domestic sales and purchases. As a result, it is possible that a
firm with a high degree of specialization in US trade relations, according to our measure,
is actually specialized in domestic transactions. We would overstate the degree of such
a firms’ exposure and may likewise understate the exposure of highly export-oriented
firms. Although we cannot rule out such a possibility, we expect that such measurement
error would lead to an attenuation bias and loss of precision in our point estimates.
4.1.2 Tariff and trade data
To construct our measures of firm-level exposure, we combine information from two
datasets. The first is the China Customs dataset, in which we observe export and im-
port values at the product-firm-destination (or source) country level for all international
transactions in 2016. We use this information to compute the firm-specific weights that
capture their relative reliance on US trade relations. We combine this data with a detailed
dataset of US tariffs imposed upon China, as well as Chinese retaliatory tariffs on the US,
which is reported at a monthly frequency for the years 2016-2019. We collected the recip-
rocal Chinese and US tariffs from several data sources, including official communications
by the US Trade Representative, the CARD Trade War Tariffs Database (Li, 2018), as well
as data provided by Fajgelbaum et al. (2020) and Bown and Kolb (2019). US and Chinese
MFN tariff rates were collected from the WTO (World Trade Organization) Tariff Down-
load Facility database. Chinese MFN tariffs were further complemented with data from
Bown and Kolb (2019), which includes more recent changes in tariffs based on official
government communications.
The evolution of these tariffs has already been discussed in Section 3, Figure 2, and we
provide further details for the period 2018-2019 in Table B.3. Columns (1)-(4) show that,
starting with MFN tariff rates of 3.6% and 9.2% in an average (6-digit HS) product cat-
egory, both the US and China increased their reciprocally bilateral discriminatory tariffs
up to 23.2% and 25.1% respectively in just two years. Columns (5)-(8) indicate increases
19Note that the year of 2016 pre-date the years of Donald Trump’s presidency. Although he threatened to
impose new trade policy measures against China already during his electoral campaign, his victory in late
2016 was a surprising outcome that is unlikely to have driven anticipatory behavior among Chinese firms.
See Amiti et al. (2019) for further discussion on this issue. Also note that any major anticipation effects in
firms’ hiring behavior would induce a downward bias on our estimated coefficients.
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in very similar orders of magnitude for our firm-level measure of tariff exposure obtained
from Equations (1) and (2). The period since May 2019 is of central interest for our study,
where we observe an average increase in firm-level US tariff exposure by about 7.8 per-
centage points (i.e., from 0.169 to 0.247 in column (5)). Firm-level exposure to retaliatory
tariffs increased by about 7.0 percentage points (i.e., from 0.136 to 0.206 in column (7)).
4.2 Estimation
4.2.1 Empirical baseline specification
To investigate the effect of tariffs on firms’ recruiting behavior, we adopt a simple linear
panel regression model:
yft = β1 ln(1 + TariffUSf,t−1) + β2 ln(1 + Tariff
CHN
f,t−1) + X′ctγ + ηf + ηt + εft, (3)
where TariffUSf,t−1 and Tariff
CHN
f,t−1 are US and Chinese tariffs faced by firm f , lagged by one
month. We employ lagged tariff exposure since we count vacancies as monthly totals,
while actual implementation and responses could have taken place on different dates dur-
ing the same month. By using lags, we avoid potential problems arising from a different
order of events and also allow firms a limited amount of time to adjust to the tariffs.20 In
line with the empirical trade literature we employ tariff exposure as an iceberg trade-cost
term by adding one to the tariff rate and taking logs (e.g., a 5 percent of firm tariff expo-
sure measure would enter the equation as ln(1.05)). Overall, the estimated coefficients β1
and β2 will indicate the average treatment effect of the final round in the US-China trade
war that reveals throughout our 5 months of observations.
To isolate the effect as good as possible, we control for potentially confounding fac-
tors and implement firm fixed effects (ηf ) and time fixed effects (ηt) into our baseline
estimation equation. Time fixed effects control for aggregate trends or shocks that are
correlated with both our dependent variable and our main variables of interest. This in-
cludes, for example, seasonal fluctuations in hiring which might happen to coincide with
tariff changes. Firm fixed effects are included to control for unobservable time-invariant
characteristics of a firm. This is of particular importance in our context, as we do not ob-
serve many firm-level characteristics, including its hiring history. However, as we can ob-
serve firms’ location (at the city level c), we employ time-varying control variables along
these dimensions in vector Xct to capture aggregate developments in local labor markets.
20Meinen et al. (2019) show that the effects of the trade war on US imports from China started to materi-
alize in the last quarter of 2018, i.e. in the quarter after the first tariffs had come into effect. This is also in
line with our descriptive evidence presented in Figure B.1.
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Specifically, we include the total number of firms posting job vacancies as well as the to-
tal number of job vacancies available in city c and at time t.21 Finally, εft denotes an i.i.d.
error term which we cluster at the city-month level. As an alternative to our baseline
specification, we also estimate a model with firm (ηf ), city-time (ηct), and industry-time
(ηjt) fixed effects to control for distinct seasonality patterns along those dimensions.
4.2.2 Dependent variables
We employ a number of different dependent variables, yft, to analyze alternative out-
comes of the US-China trade war. The primary outcome of interest, however, is the num-
ber of job vacancies posted by a firm. Such job ads denote the “extensive margin” of firms’
hiring activity and we consider two ways of measuring it. First, we measure the stock of
job ads held by a firm in a particular month. That is, if a firm posts a job in May and it
is still online in June and July, it will be counted into our measure of active job postings.
A caveat arises when we want to interpret any changes in this variable, due to our in-
ability to observe why a job ad disappears. This can be due to a successful match or due
to a withdrawal that resulted from changed hiring decisions. We therefore also consider
the flow of newly posted vacancies. With this measure, each job ad is counted only once,
and a vacancy is considered as being new, whenever it could be observed at download
instance t but not at the previous instance t − 1. A change in this measure might give a
clearer indication of the firm’s hiring activity.
Next to counting the number of online job vacancies, we are also interested in the
content of the job ads. We analyze these by observing (i) measures of the nominal wage
offered in a firms’ average job-ad; (ii) indicators of other forms of compensation, such as
bonus payments, subsidies or insurances; and (iii) job requirements, as specified by pre-
vious work experience and educational background. A detailed overview of the variables
along with further descriptions is provided in Table B.4. Since these measures relate to
the “intensive margin” of the job ads, we take into account the possibility (and practice)
of firms to update their existing vacancies over time. We therefore compute firm-level
averages of these variables based on the stock of active vacancies in a particular month.
4.2.3 Sample structure
As indicated in Section 2, we analyze the impact of the trade war on the hiring behav-
ior for a subpopulation of firms that are engaged in international trade. The reasons for
21Since every firm f resides only in a single location, we suppress city subscripts c in our dependent
variable and in the tariff measures to avoid confusion about the dimensions of their variation.
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doing so are threefold. First, many firms in our job-vacancy data might be unaffected by
the trade war, simply because they do not engage in international trade (directly or indi-
rectly). Second, even if they are affected indirectly, it is impossible for us to measure their
exposure to the trade war, as we do not observe such information.22 Third, since typically
only a fraction of firms in a country are involved in international transactions, and as
such firms are quite distinct from non-trading firms, we do not believe that non-trading
firms constitute an appropriate control group.23 Instead, our control group comprises an
abundant number of firms that trade internationally but not with the US. For those firms
TariffUSft and Tariff
CHN
ft are equal to zero by construction and they count about a third of
the firms in our sample. Likewise, we observe about equally-sized groups of firms which
are exposed to the trade war through only one channel: either via their exports or via
their imports. Overall, about half of the firms in our sample are exposed to the additional
tariffs imposed during the most recent round of the trade war, while the remaining firms
do trade with the US but were not affected by these tariffs.24
Table B.5 provides further information on the variation in our sample. It shows sum-
mary statistics for average vacancy stocks, wage offers, and firm characteristics by sub-
samples of firms with varying lengths of posting job ads.25 Not only does the number
of firms differ across these sub-samples, characteristics such as the number of vacancies
posted, average wage and scale of firms also vary. Both the number of job vacancies and
average wages have an upward trend as the duration of job posting increases. Firms with
larger numbers of employees are more likely to continuously post job-ads, while small-
scale firms post jobs for a shorter duration. This suggests that larger firms also offer better
paid jobs on average. Ownership types of firms posting jobs across months are relatively
stable across posting lengths. Overall, our data appears to feature sufficient within- and
across-firm variation to exploit for the purposes of this study.
22Also the reported (more aggregated) industry affiliations cannot be directly translated into firm expo-
sure via input-output linkages as done, for instance, by Flaaen and Pierce (2020). This has implications for
the interpretation of our results as we explain in our concluding remarks below.
23One reason for this skepticism is differences in firm size that typically prevail between trading and
non-trading firms. Another reason is the different market environments in which such firms operate. While
trading firms operate at a global scale in highly competitive markets, non-trading firms may be shielded
from such competition if they produce and sell exclusively in domestic (niche) markets.
24In our robustness check below, we report results for firms’ overall hiring activity based on alternative
compositions of our control group.
25In the first panel, 1-month firms, corresponds to summary statistics for firms that post job ads in only one
of the seven months we observe in our sample, while the next panel, 2-month firms, features firms posting




5.1.1 Number of job vacancies
Our first dependent variable measures the absolute number of job vacancies posted by
firm f at time t. Since this is a count variable which features zeros and otherwise discrete
positive values, we present results for a linear regression approach, as introduced in the
previous section, and for a Poisson regression model (Wooldridge, 2010; Marinescu and
Rathelot, 2018).
Table 2: Number of vacancy postings and exposure to tariffs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Stock (all job vacancies) Flow (new job vacancies)
Number of vacancies (N vft) OLS OLS Poisson OLS OLS Poisson
ln(1 + TariffCHNft−1) -3.219 -3.247 0.270 -7.725** -7.567** 0.176
(2.575) (2.820) (0.356) (2.300) (2.346) (0.471)
ln(1 + TariffUSft−1) -3.322** -4.200** -0.492** -2.190* -6.265*** -0.651**
(1.145) (1.582) (0.224) (1.112) (1.348) (0.311)
Observations 189,272 188,909 188,705 189,196 188,880 188,479
R-squared 0.763 0.767 0.522 0.536
City Controls Y Y
Month FE Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
City-Month FE Y Y Y Y
Sector-Month FE Y Y Y Y
Notes: Regressions use firm online job vacancy data from May through November 2019. Results in col-
umn (1)-(3) are based on the stock of firms’ job vacancies, where job ads are counted independently across
months. Results in column (4)-(6) are based on flow of new job vacancies, where only the first appearance
of each job ID is counted. Time-varying city-level control variables include the total number of firms and
vacancies observed. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. For linear models, estimated coefficients
denote semi-elasticities and standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the city and month level. For
the Poisson fixed-effects models, coefficients reflect estimated elasticities and reported standard errors are
bootstrapped. Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 2 displays the results for the stock and flow of firms’ job postings, respectively, in
columns (1)-(3) and (4)-(6). Throughout all specifications, we find a negative and statisti-
cally significant effect of increasing US tariffs on job postings of exposed firms. Including
city- and sector-month fixed effects into our model results in quantitatively larger coeffi-
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cient estimates, as shown in columns (1)-(2) and (4)-(5). Also the Poisson model suggests
that firms that exported to the US reduced hiring efforts when facing increased tariffs.
Generally, this effect reveals stronger when we measure the flow of job vacancies, which
implies that exposed firms advertise fewer new jobs.
To give these coefficients a quantitative interpretation, we consider the result from
column (2) to infer that a one log-point increase in ln(1 + TariffUSft−1) results in 4.2 fewer
job vacancies on average per firm. In fact, using numbers from Table B.3, we see that
this variable increased by about 0.065 log points during our sample period. This implies
about 0.27 fewer jobs offers by an average firm between May and November 2019. As
we observe about 20,500 firms at the beginning of our sample, the estimated job loss
amounts to approximately 5,600 fewer job postings in total. In relative terms, we observe
in Table B.2 that an average firm posted about 11.34 job ads at the beginning of our sample
period, so that the estimated 0.27 fewer jobs per firm correspond to a reduction by 2.4
percent. Our Poisson results, displayed in column (3), suggest a similar reduction by
(0.492×0.065≈) 3.2 percent.
In contrast to the US tariffs, coefficients estimated for the effect of China’s retaliation
are less robust. The linear models result in negative coefficient estimates, which are sta-
tistically significant only for the new job ads in columns (4) and (5). This would point
towards a detrimental effect of Chinese retaliation tariffs on firms’ scale of activity, which
results in less hiring. However, the Poisson model suggests the opposite when it reports
a positive (albeit statistically insignificant) coefficient, which would point towards an in-
creased hiring activity. Overall, the average treatment effect of China’s retaliation on
firms’ hiring activity remains inconclusive.
5.1.2 Average Wage per Vacancy
We next study how firms’ wage schedules responded to the tariff changes. To do so, we
compute for each firm f the average wage wft offered in the vacancies it had posted at
time t. Since job ads (v) typically indicate a wage range, i.e. a minimum and a maximum
wage (or salary) level, we analyze responses in both of these wages separately and in ad-
dition responses in the average of the two (wmeanfvt ≡ (wminfvt +wmaxfvt )/2). In all specifications,
we measure wage rates in logs.
Table 3 presents our results. We find small positive, yet statistically insignificant, re-
sponses to Chinese retaliation tariffs, and negative statistically significant coefficients for
the effect of US tariffs on advertised wage levels. Columns (1) and (2) suggest that the
lower bound of annual wages offered in our observed job ads decreased among firms
that were more exposed to the trade war. The same can be found for the upper bound of
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Table 3: Wage offers and exposure to tariffs
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Wage/salary (lnwft) Minimum Maximum Average Dispersion
ln(1 + TariffCHNft−1) 0.009 -0.002 0.035 0.022 0.026 0.014 0.026 0.025
(0.044) (0.045) (0.046) (0.048) (0.045) (0.046) (0.015) (0.017)
ln(1 + TariffUSft−1) -0.085** -0.083* -0.073* -0.065* -0.077* -0.071* 0.013 0.018
(0.034) (0.042) (0.031) (0.038) (0.032) (0.039) (0.011) (0.012)
Observations 107,800 107,448 107,800 107,448 107,800 107,448 107,800 107,448
R-squared 0.738 0.742 0.732 0.736 0.734 0.738 0.736 0.740
City Controls Y Y Y Y
Month FE Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
City-Month FE Y Y Y Y
Sector-Month FE Y Y Y Y
Notes: Regressions use firm online job vacancy data from May through November 2019. Average wages
in columns (1) to (6) are measured in logs (lnwft); wage dispersion in columns (7) and (8) is measured as
(lnwmaxft − lnwminft ). Coefficients report estimated wage-tariff elasticities. Time-varying city-level control
variables include the total number of firms and vacancies observed. Standard errors are reported in paren-
theses and adjusted for clustering at the city and month level. Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
annual wages and for the average of the two, in columns (3)-(4) and (5)-(6), respectively.
Throughout, the estimated coefficients suggest a fairly low elasticity of wages with re-
spect to faced tariffs among Chinese firms. Yet, given the major increase in tariff levels
during the trade war, the coefficients imply about ((ln([1.247])− ln[1.169])× β̂1) ≈ 0.5 per-
cent lower wages offered by affected firms (which corresponds to about $70 less per year,
if the average wage compensation is $14,500 as stated in Table 1).26 The last two columns
confirm that the size of the indicated wage intervals does not change significantly among
firms.
5.1.3 Non-wage compensation
A lower offered wage does not necessarily imply the labor costs would decrease. Non-
wage compensation can account for major portions of total labor costs (Woodbury, 1983;
Liu et al., 2019). Indeed, it might be convenient for firms to offer alternative forms of
compensation if they have different means to providing such benefits. To evaluate such
26Since job postings quote nominal wages, the income loss in purchasing power adjusted terms is likely
to be higher, given overall lower price levels in China compared to high income economies. For example,
according to World Bank data, China’s PPP-adjusted GDP per capita is about 50 percent higher than the
nominal figure.
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adjustments, we focus on three different forms of alternative compensation schemes:
bonuses, subsidies, and insurances. With bonuses firms can avoid early commitments
to paying higher wages when the actual performance of the future employee (but also of
the firm as a whole during the trade war) is uncertain. Subsidies include the provision of
overtime pay or transportation, communication, and meal allowances by the employer,
whereas insurances include the provision of a “five-insurances” package that is part of
China’s social security system.27
To evaluate whether firms increasingly advertise the provision of such alternative
forms of compensation, we compute the share of a firm’s job ads including such com-




v∈Ωft 1fvt(the advertisement explicitly offers bonus)
N vft
(4)
where Ωft denotes the mass of all vacancies posted by firm f in month t,N vft is the number
of job vacancies posted by firm f in month t, and 1fvt is an indicator variable that equals
to one if job-ad v explicitly mentions that the job will be offered with performance-based
bonus payment. We compute shares of jobs offering subsidies, ShareSubft , and insurances,
ShareInsft , in the same fashion.
Table 4 reports our results. Using our baseline specification, we find that firms ex-
posed to higher US tariffs increasingly advertise bonus payments and subsidies as a form
of non-wage compensation. This would be in line with earlier conjectures that such pay-
ment schemes offer greater flexibility to employers, while providing adequate incentives
for qualified candidates to apply (Luft, 1994). However, as we turn to our more demand-
ing specification, including city- and sector-specific time effects, point estimates become
smaller and loose statistical significance. About half of the originally estimated effect
can be attributed to general industry-level dynamics.28 This suggests that sectors where
relatively more US-tariff exposed firms operate have been experiencing a general trend
in moving towards increased non-wage compensation schemes, and that potential re-
sponses due to the trade war are statistically indistinguishable from this trend.
Considering the corresponding coefficients for China’s retaliation tariffs, we find sim-
27The five insurances include unemployment, pension, medical, work-related injury, and maternity in-
surances. While being mandatory in principle, it is not implemented throughout the country and some
foreign enterprises might be eligible for exemptions from it. See www.china-briefing.com/news/social-
insurance for an overview.
28We experimented with different combinations of fixed effects and found that downward correction of
point estimates and loss of statistical significance arises from the inclusion of sector-month fixed effects.
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Table 4: Non-wage compensation and exposure to tariffs
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share of vacancies offering Bonuses Subsidies Insurances
ln(1 + TariffCHNft−1) 0.051* 0.063* 0.012 0.005 0.016 0.024
(0.026) (0.027) (0.044) (0.046) (0.026) (0.025)
ln(1 + TariffUSft−1) 0.050** 0.025 0.046** 0.022 0.016 0.010
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.020) (0.020)
Observations 107,800 107,442 107,800 107,442 107,800 107,442
R-squared 0.855 0.857 0.863 0.865 0.864 0.866
City Control Y Y Y
Month FE Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
City-Month FE Y Y Y
Sector-Month FE Y Y Y
Notes: Regressions use firm online job vacancy data from May through November 2019. Dependent vari-
ables denote fractions, coefficients report estimated semi-elasticities. Time-varying city-level controls in-
clude total number of firms and vacancies observed. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and ad-
justed for clustering at the city and month level. Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
ilar results in terms of signs, but differences in magnitudes and precision. Coefficients for
subsidies, in columns (3) and (4), are quantitatively small and statistically insignificant.
The same is true for the share of vacancies offering insurances, where neither US nor
Chinese tariffs appear to have affected such policies. In terms of bonus payments, how-
ever, we find a robust positive and statistically significant effect of Chinese retaliation in
the trade war, which is suggestive of a shift towards performance-based compensation
among exposed firms. Although none of our previous indicators revealed a clear system-
atic response by firms to retaliatory tariffs, the positive signs for wages, vacancy postings
(using Poisson estimators) and those presented here (in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4)
might be suggestive of a slight increase in labor demand among firms that attempt to
substitute imports from the US. Overall, the empirical evidence for an average treatment
effect on offering non-wage compensation components is mixed.
5.1.4 Job requirement
Besides adjustments in offered employee compensation, we are also interested in poten-
tially changing job requirements, which might point towards a shifting scope of activities
among exposed firms. Indeed, changes in wages and in the number of posted vacancies
could be associated with changes in job requirements. Deming and Kahn (2018), for ex-
ample, document a positive correlation between average wages offered and the required
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number of years of schooling. As we found fewer job offers overall, as well as slightly
lower wage compensation in our data, we might expect that also the required educational
background will be lower.
Like in the previous subsection, we analyze effects on firms’ job requirements by mea-




v∈Ωft 1fvt(the advertisement explicitely require college degree)
N vft
(5)
where Ωft denotes the mass of all vacancies posted by firm f in month t,N vft is the number
of job vacancies posted by firm f in month t and 1fvt is an indicator variable that equals
to one if the advertisement v explicitly mention that the qualified applicants will require
a college degree. Next to educational background requirements, firms might also adjust
requirements regarding previous work experience (Cai and Stoyanov, 2016). We therefore
construct corresponding measures for the lower and upper bounds of requested working
experience (measured in years), as well as their average.
Table 5: Job requirements and exposure to tariffs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable Previous work experience (in years) College degree
Minimum Maximum Average Fraction
ln(1 + TariffCHNft−1) 0.006 0.022 -0.024 -0.007 -0.009 0.008 0.027 0.023
(0.095) (0.121) (0.135) (0.171) (0.114) (0.145) (0.038) (0.035)
ln(1 + TariffUSft−1) -0.067 0.018 -0.067 0.040 -0.067 0.029 -0.070** -0.043*
(0.055) (0.071) (0.082) (0.102) (0.068) (0.086) (0.021) (0.022)
Observations 107,544 107,181 107,544 107,181 107,544 107,181 107,800 107,437
R-squared 0.745 0.748 0.744 0.748 0.745 0.749 0.712 0.716
City Control Y Y Y Y
Month FE Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
City-Month FE Y Y Y Y
Sector-Month FE Y Y Y Y
Notes: Regressions use firm online job vacancy data from May through November 2019. Dependent vari-
ables denote number of years in columns (1)-(6) and fractions in columns (7)-(8); coefficients report esti-
mated semi-elasticities. Time-varying city-level controls include total number of firms and vacancies ob-
served. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and adjusted for clustering at the city and month level.
Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The results are reported in Table 5, where columns (1)-(6) suggest that neither US nor
Chinese tariffs had any systematic impact on required working experience. However, we
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observe in column (7) and (8) that firms exposed to US tariffs significantly decreased the
fraction of job ads requiring a college degree. In contrast to this, we obtain positive (but
again statistically insignificant) coefficients for the effect of China’s retaliation on educa-
tion background requirements in firms’ vacancy postings. The decrease in educational
background requirements among US-tariff exposed firms is consistent with the reported
decrease in average wage offers and potentially results from a compositional effect as
firms scale down on their relatively more exposed skill-intensive goods (see Figure B.3).29
Altogether, our findings suggest that the US-China trade war had a mostly one-sided
impact on the labor demand and hiring behavior of Chinese firms that were directly ex-
posed to higher tariffs. While exporters facing higher US tariffs reveal lower labor de-
mand, wages and skill demand (as well as a tendency to adopt more flexible and non-
wage compensation schemes), importing firms’ adjustments are less clear-cut.
5.2 Robustness checks
In this subsection, we scrutinize the robustness of our findings by addressing potential
concerns regarding our identification.
5.2.1 Placebo experiment with randomly assigned tariff exposures
For our first robustness check, we perform a placebo experiment in which we randomly
assign Chinese and US tariff exposure to firms. The purpose of doing this is to test how
likely it is that our baseline findings reflect coincidental correlations.30 By assigning tariff
exposure randomly to firms in our sample, we expect our earlier findings to disappear if
the envisaged mechanism is correctly identified.





s,t , Type ∈ {US,CHN}, (6)
where s indexes a firm that is randomly drawn from our original estimation sample. That
is, f adopts the level of exposure we actually for firm s, which we draw randomly from
our sample. We repeat the above procedure 30 times to obtain a bootstrapped “fictional”
sample and carry out our previous analysis once again. The results are reported in Ap-
pendix Tables C.2-C.5. None of our previously significant estimates can be reproduced in
29Indeed, we find that the decrease in wage offers due to US tariffs is partially explained by a lower
fraction of jobs requiring a college degree. We report the corresponding regression results in Table C.1.
30A similar placebo test has been employed by Beverelli et al. (2017) to study the effect of restriction on
service trade.
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our placebo estimation, which supports our baseline results and their economic interpre-
tation.
5.2.2 Control for pre-trends
Our second robustness check concerns our short sample period. With tariffs entering
into force in May and June 2019, and using a one-period lag, we can barely control for
pre-trends. This may cast doubts about the existence of a causal relationship between
our outcome variables and firms’ tariff exposure. In fact, firms’ trade structure might
be correlated with underlying factors that determine differential trends in labor demand
while being unrelated to the trade war. We attempt to address this concern by drawing on
information from the Annual Survey of Industrial Production (ASIP), which allows us to
observe actual employment and average wages paid for a subset of our firms in the years
2012-2013; long before the trade war.31 Inference relies on a falsification test in which
we estimate the observed firm-level change in (log) employment and (log) average wage
payments between 2012 and 2013. A statistically significant coefficients for our measures
of tariff exposure would suggest a potentially underlying long-term trend in our data and
challenge our identification.
Table C.6 presents the results for realized employment in columns (1)-(4) and for av-
erage realized wages in columns (5)-(8), using different combinations of fixed effects and
controls. Without any fixed effects or firm-level controls, we find systematically higher
employment growth among US-tariff exposed firms and slower wage increases. Esti-
mated coefficients are corrected downwards and lose statistical significance as soon as
we include industry fixed effects, city fixed effects or firm-level control variables (i.e. to-
tal sales). Exposure to Chinese retaliation tariffs reveals statistically insignificant results
throughout and with opposite signs. Compared to our main results, historical employ-
ment among exposed firms appears to have followed a different trend, which lends some
confidence to our identification strategy. The results are somewhat less conclusive for
historical wage growth, where coefficients reveal the same sign but statistical significance
is considerably weaker.
5.2.3 Timing of the effects
Instead of considering historical employment and wage growth for a subset of firms,
we might infer validity also by looking at the timing of the estimated effects. The most
31The ASIP is conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of China. The survey includes manufactur-
ing sector firms whose revenue is more than five million RMB each year. We are able to match 4,669 firms
based on their reported company name and location.
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intuitive assumption would be to expect adjustments to occur immediately or at least
soon after newly imposed tariffs apply. Later adjustments should be weaker. However,
if our estimated coefficients capture an underlying pre-trend, we should observe fairly
similar effects at different instances in our sample.
In Table C.7, we include deeper lags of tariff exposure into our regression for the num-
ber of job vacancies posted by firms. Estimated responses to China’s retaliatory tariffs
remain fairly fragile and inconsistent across specifications, like in our main findings. Ad-
ditional US tariffs appear to have mainly immediate effects and weaker (and less consis-
tent) effects in later periods. Tables C.8-C.11 further support this finding, suggesting that
deeper lags of tariffs alone are statistically insignificant for most of our outcome variables,
and considerably smaller and less significant for the number of vacancies.
5.2.4 Alternative control groups
We scrutinize identification further by considering alternative control groups. Our origi-
nal sample pools different groups of firms, including those that did not sell to or source
from the US at all (henceforth, Group 1, being unexposed by definition) and those that
traded with the US, but not in goods targeted by China III/IV tariffs (Group 2). The for-
mer counts 7,676 firms in our estimation sample and should facilitate better identification
than the latter, which counts only 1,213 firms. Group 2 can be viewed as being exposed to
a higher tariff risk, and hence more similar to the treatment group, given its trade linkages
with the US, potential treatment in earlier rounds (China I and II) and the surrounding
trade policy uncertainty (e.g. Benguria et al., 2020).32
When we re-estimate our main specifications on vacancy postings considering the re-
spective control groups separately, we find that reductions in the number of job ads are
quantitatively and statistically more pronounced relative to Group 1. In fact, as shown
in columns (3)-(4) of Table C.12, the estimated semi-elasticity of new vacancy postings
with respect to US tariff increases is almost twice as high relative to Group 1 than for
Group 2. Also responses to retaliation tariffs appear to be more pronounced relative to
the non-exposed set of firms that never traded with the US in the base-year 2016. The fact
that results remain statistically significant even when we keep control Group 1 out of our
sample suggests that identification operates also via the product-mix of firms’ imports
and exports, which results in differential degrees of exposure to tariffs.
32The treatment group comprises 12,600 firms in our sample, so that the overall population amounts to
21,489 firms. This number results from the fact that some firms have only one (or few) observations in total
during the sample period, so that the inclusion of fixed effects results in perfectly collinearity and removal
from the sample.
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We conclude from this subsection that firm-level adjustments in the number of va-
cancy postings (i.e. labor demand) can be interpreted as causally related to tariff increases
experienced during the trade war. Adjustments in other dimensions have been generally
more fragile, making rigorous causal inference more difficult.
5.3 Firm heterogeneity
So far, our results revealed the estimated average tariff effects and we have not paid much
attention to potentially heterogeneous responses across firms. To explore this, we con-
sider two main dimensions of firm heterogeneity in this subsection, distinguishing their
size (as revealed from the aggregated trade volume in our base-year 2016) and their own-
ership (as revealed from the firm-level information provided via the online job portal
51job.com). We also consider potentially heterogeneous responses between firms with
different trade baskets in terms of product range and characteristics.
5.3.1 Firm size
Based on their observed trade volumes in 2016 (i.e., exports plus imports), we divide
firms into three equally-sized groups: small, medium and large. For each of these sub-
samples, we re-run our main specifications and report the obtained point estimates with
corresponding 95% confidence intervals graphically.33
Figure C.1 presents estimates for labor demand, as measured by their total number of
job vacancy postings. Responses to higher US tariffs are displayed on the left, while ad-
justments to Chinese tariffs are shown on the right. Panel (a) reports the semi-elasticities
obtained from our linear panel specification, while Panel (b) reports estimated elastici-
ties obtained from the Poisson model. Figure C.2 reports findings for changes in offered
wages among firms’ job ads, while Figures C.3 and C.4 focus on the different forms of
non-wage compensation and advertised job-prerequisites, respectively.
We find that large firms tend to be the least responsive to any kind of tariff and in terms
of most outcome variables. In some cases, large confidence intervals suggest heterogene-
ity even within this group, but point estimates for the number of vacancy postings or ad-
vertised wage offers are typically closer to zero than for other firms. A tendency towards
increasing number of job postings offering bonus payments and employee subsidies can
be observed for these firms, as well as a modest increase in educational requirements
33In our sample periods (i.e., May to November of 2019), the average exposure to US tariffs for small-,
medium-, and large-size firms are 0.03, 0.09 and 0.13, respectively; the average exposure to China’s tariffs
for small-, medium-, and large-size firms are 0.04, 0.06 and 0.10, respectively.
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when facing US tariffs. This contrasts with the findings for other firms and also with
average effect found for the pooled sample above.
Concerning small firms, we find this group to be the most diverse, given the large
confidence intervals. While point estimates indicate substantial downward adjustments
in job postings, wage offers, subsidy offers and job pre-requisites (following US tariff in-
creases), they rarely pass the 5% significance threshold. Adjustments are typically more
modest and less precisely estimated in the case of Chinese retaliatory tariffs. Despite
their within-group heterogeneity, however, they seem to contribute to the robust results
reported for adjustments to US tariffs in terms of labor demand, wage offers and educa-
tional background requirements.
Medium-sized firms constitute the group with the clearest results overall. They ap-
pear to scale down, offer lower wages, and request less educational background (and to
some extent working experience) when facing additional US tariffs. Non-wage compen-
sation tends to increase most significantly in terms of subsidies and modestly in terms of
offering bonus payments (like most other firms). Interestingly, when affected by Chinese
retaliatory tariffs, these firms appear to increase efforts to attract more educated and ex-
perienced workers, which reveals from adjustments in announced job-prerequisites and
from a marginal increase in offered wages and bonus payments. Such a pattern cannot
be observed in other groups and might indicate that medium-sized firms seek to produce
previously imported inputs themselves.
5.3.2 Firm ownership
Different ownership structures might result in diverse adjustment strategies to tariffs, as
firms rely on different decision-making procedures, resources, and networks. For ex-
ample, while state-owned firms might be theoretically more protected from bankruptcy,
foreign owned firms might be able to rely on an international network that allows them to
re-route trade flows and cushion the effect of bilateral trade barriers (Flaaen et al., 2020).
Domestic private firms would be most directly exposed to market forces and less resilient
to short-term policy shocks. Figure C.5 presents estimates for the number of job-ads,
separately for state-owned enterprises, foreign owned firms and private domestic enter-
prises.34 Figure C.6 displays corresponding results for average wage offers, while Figures
C.7 and C.8 show findings for offered non-wage compensation and job-requirements.
34Information on firm ownership is provided by the online job-ad platform. State-owned firms includes
public institution, state-owned enterprise and government agencies. Foreign-owned firms are enterprises
owned by foreign nationals, and the rest are private firms. In the regression sample state-owned and
foreign-owned firms account for 5.80% and 28.6% of the total, respectively.
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Concerning responses to US tariff increases first, our estimated average effects appear
to be driven mainly (and sometimes exclusively) by the privately-owned domestic enter-
prises. They indicate highly significant reductions in the number job postings, announced
wage offers and educational requirements. Chinese SOEs also report lower numbers of
job postings, but deviate in their responses regarding wage offers and requested educa-
tional background. The job advertising behavior of foreign owned enterprises appears to
be virtually unaffected by the US tariffs, which might suggests that these firms have ways
to circumvent tariffs.
Turning to China’s retaliatory tariffs, besides posting fewer vacancies, privately-owned
domestic firms appear to be relatively non-responsive, while China’s SOEs show some
(but generally imprecisely estimated) adjustments in hiring activity, average compensa-
tion offers and job requirements. Foreign-owned firms stand out by significantly low-
ering their number of job vacancy postings, while increasing wage and bonus payment
offers. While strong conclusions from these patterns should be treated with caution, fewer
and better-paid job offers by foreign-owned firms could suggest that interrupted supply
chains resulted in downscaling of their production and a shift towards more strategic and
management-oriented activities in the short term. Chinese firms in turn might be more
efficient in switching quickly to alternative suppliers so that additional tariffs on US im-
ports result in fewer observable adjustments, although they also show signs of scaling
down by posting fewer job ads.
5.3.3 Further dimensions
Next to firm heterogeneity in terms of size and ownership, also the product mix of their
imports and exports might determine tariff effects on labor demand. For example, firms
that sell mainly homogeneous (i.e. highly standardized) products face stiffer competition
and might be hit harder by a tariff than firms that sell differentiated (or even customized)
goods. The latter translates into a relatively lower elasticity of substitution and a smaller
tariff effect. Conversely, firms that source mainly homogeneous goods might find it eas-
ier to substitute suppliers than those who import differentiated products. Our results in
Panel A of Table C.13 seem to support this reasoning when we interact tariff effects with
the fraction of homogeneous goods in firms’ respective trade basket to estimate adjust-
ments in the number of vacancy postings and average wage offers.35 Other attributes of
job vacancies do not reveal any statistically different effects along this dimension.
We also find some differential adjustments for firms trading a relatively narrow range
35We use the conventional classification by Rauch (1999) to determine firms’ homogeneous product share
in exports and imports in the base year 2016.
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of products, which might make it harder to switch to alternative revenue sources. As
we show in Panel B of Table C.13, when facing additional US tariffs, such firms offer
lower wages and more bonus payments, while requiring lower educational background
and more working experience than other firms.36 Narrow-range importers reveal signifi-
cantly differential adjustments only for the number of vacancy postings, where they indi-
cate increased hiring activity. This could suggest that relatively “specialized” importers
seek to switch towards in-house production, although announced job prerequisites and
compensation does not indicate significantly different responses.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we present new evidence on the labor market effects of bilateral tariffs which
were reciprocally applied in a recent period of increased political tensions between the US
and China. We exploit information from a newly complied data set of vacancy postings
in China, which enables us to trace the hiring behavior and advertised job characteris-
tics of firms over time. Our findings suggest that the trade war exerted predominantly
destructive effects, which we observe in terms of overall hiring activity, but also in the
announced wage compensation.
A novel and unique feature of our study is the use of vacancy postings which we ex-
tracted from a popular Chinese online job portal, 51job.com. A key advantage of the data,
next to its timely availability, is that it provides detailed insights into the demand side of
the labor market. Although it does not allow us to observe firms’ actual employment, we
can observe when and how often firms post a new vacancy and what they are looking for
exactly. Such information reveals insights on firms’ short-term future-oriented decision
making. We further document that our data is highly representative of the general scale of
economic activity across Chinese prefectural cities. Nevertheless, the general tendency of
online job vacancy data to be skewed towards relatively higher-paid white-collar jobs im-
plies that also our findings capture only a part of the labor-demand response to the trade
war. Blue-collar jobs might reveal similar or perhaps even stronger responses which we
do not capture in our paper.
For our analysis, we exploit information from a subset of internationally trading firms,
which we identify via matching information reported in China Customs Statistics. Our
measure of tariff exposure is therefore constrained to the directly exposed firms, although
we could expect that major adjustments to the trade policy shock might propagate via
36We define those firms based on the number of goods they exported and imported in 2016 and consider
the bottom third as “small-scope” enterprises, using a binary indicator variable as an interaction term.
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firms’ local supply networks. The sectoral affiliation of firms reported in the online va-
cancy data prevents us from tracing such networks. Identifying such firm-to-firm trade
linkages within China would likely increase the overall scope of exposure to the trade
war and allow us to measure and evaluate it more precisely and in a larger sample. We
therefore interpret our findings as a lower bound whenever we report aggregates, such
as the estimated total reduction in the number of job ads.
Similarly, our study relies on a fairly short period of observations, which extends from
May through November 2019, and captures only the most recent round of tariff increases
between the US and China. While we are confident that our results are not driven by
potentially differential pre-trends across firms, we cannot fully rule out the possibility that
major adjustments had already taken place during previous tariff rounds in 2018 (or after
the definite announcement of the most recent round). To this end, our estimates might
understate the true tariff effects on labor demand. Related to this is also our inability
to include more recent data into our sample, given the announcement of the “Phase-one
deal” between the two countries in December 2019 and the major economic disruptions
that followed the outbreak the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020. A medium-term perspective
would have been of particular interest to understand whether firms revoke short-term
decisions or whether they delay certain adjustments.
Notwithstanding these limitations, our study contributes to improving our under-
standing of how firms and labor markets respond to major trade policy shocks and protec-
tionist policies. The results reported for China in this paper appear familiar from related
findings for the US, suggesting that similar mechanisms are at work.
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A Data Appendix
A.1 Web example of a job advertisement
Figure A.1(a) displays a screenshot from the 51job.com website, showing the default for-
mat and information of vacancy postings. Panel (b) of the figure displays an example of
a corresponding web-address (URL), which is used to uniquely identify a job vacancy.
Figure A.1: Example of an online vacancy posted at 51job.com
(a) Job page
(b) URL-based vacancy ID
Note: Figures depict screenshots from the 51job.com website (red lines and blue text added by authors).
Panel (a) shows a typical job ad page from which we extract job information. Panel (b) illustrates how we
distinguish vacancies via a unqiue URL. The middle part of the URL denotes the vacancy ID number.
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A.2 Data collection method
We collect our data from 51job.com using a web crawler that searches automatically for
vacancy postings on this website. To calibrate our search, we take into consideration the
structure and refreshing mechanism of the job portal.
At 51job.com, each city has a job-ad capacity limit of 100,000 vacancy postings. That
page is refreshed automatically several times per day, so that new job postings (or up-
dated existing postings) appear at the top of the list. Older job ads are passed through
to the bottom of the list and can potentially drop out when the limit is reached. We can
identify and distinguish vacancies based on their unique ID which is stored in the URL
leading to their job page (see Figure A.1(b)). Our final routine is to download the uni-
verse of job postings four times per month, at the end of each week, and to remove all
duplicates of a job, keeping only their first monthly observation.
Although it is possible that firms update or revise their job ads, we see evidence for
this only across months, not within. As shown in Table A.1, most revisions relate to the
wage offers, while non-wage benefits and job requirements are less frequently adjusted.
Overall, revisions take place only in a small fraction of the observed job postings.







Within a month 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Across months 6.19% 2.12% 1.32% 7.84%
Note: Author’s calculations based on data downloaded from 51job.com during the period May-November
2019. Numbers based on a total of 3,897,939 observed job vacancies.
In none of the 297 cities from which we download vacancy postings, the capacity limit
of the lists was reached. In fact, only eight cities count more than 100,000 unique job ads
in a month and the top three cities report about 175,000 unique job ads on average per
month, which is far below the monthly coverage of our download routine (i.e. 4×100,000).
Figure A.2(a) depicts the average number of monthly unique job postings in the top 10
cities, as well as their highest value in an individual month of our sample period. In Panel
(b) we display the overall distribution of monthly job postings across cities. Its shape is
similar to a size-rank distribution of employment across cities, which suggests that the
geographic coverage of our sample is fairly representative of China’s labor market.37
37We discuss further aspects regarding the representativeness of our data in Section 2 of the paper.
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Figure A.2: Average number of job postings per month across cities
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Employment (2016)
Note: Authors’ calculations based on data downloaded from 51job.com during period May-November 2019.
Unique job postings are identified by their URL and counted once per month upon their first appearance.
Panel (b) displays the overall distribution of average vacancy postings across cities. It can be compared with
the city-size distribution in terms of employment in 2016, as reported in the Chinese Statistical Yearbooks.
Finally, we also inspect the average number of days for which we can observe a job ad
in our sample. If a large number of job ads disappears between two download instances
in our cycle, we would risk to loose information, due to fast turnover rates. In Table A.2
column (1) we show that essentially all of the job ads we observed for the first time at
download time t is still there in t + 1 (i.e. about one week later). Columns (2)-(5) suggest
that the average and median time span for which a vacancy posting is online corresponds
to at least two, but usually more, download cycles. Turnover rates are higher in the top-
four cities. This can be inferred also from column (6), where we report the average age
of the oldest vacancy posting observed at a particular download instance. It is typically
more than eight days in the four mega cities, but ranges between three weeks or even a
month on average in the rest of China. The numbers suggest that the chosen parameters
for our download routine are generally ahead of the job-ad turnover cycle, so that we
obtain a fairly complete record of vacancy postings via 51job.com.
A.3 Descriptive and summary statistics
The descriptive statistics presented in this subsection are discussed in Section 2. Figure
A.3 displays trends in the number of monthly unique job vacancies for the manufactur-
ing sector and other industries. Figure A.4 displays standardized log-log relationship be-
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Table A.2: Turnover of vacancy postings across cities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# cycles observed
Level of City % observed in
t and t + 1
average 25th median 75th
avg. age of oldest
ad (days)
Top 4 mega cities 99.51% 2.87 [2.53] 1 2 4 8.27 [6.91]
Provincial capital cities 100% 3.40 [3.92] 2 4 7 19.92 [12.49]
Other prefecture-level city 100% 7.81 [4.60] 4 8 12 30.19 [7.14]
Notes: Four mega cities are Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen. Provincial capital cities refer to
2 central-administrated municipalities (Chongqing and Tianjin), 26 capital cities from 21 provinces and 5
autonomous regions (i.e., 28 in total). The prefecture-level cities reflect the remaining 265 cities. Numbers
next to average in brackets denote standard deviations.
tween average number of monthly vacancy postings and city size indicators. Figure A.5
shows the distribution of educational backgrounds in the working population, according
to several Censuses since the 2000s, and the corresponding pattern in our job-vacancy
data. Comparability of Census and job-vacancy data might be limited by the differential
nature of the data, which show realized versus demanded employer-employee relation-
ships respectively. Figure A.6 benchmarks official Census data from China against our
vacancy data to inspect their representativeness in terms of industry coverage and con-
centration.
Table A.3 provides additional details for comparison of our data to the Zhaopin.com
sample used by Kuhn and Shen (2013) a decade earlier. We note that the wage distribution
in our sample differs substantially from theirs, which might be explained partly by higher
living standards today compared to ten years ago. Our data are similar to Zhaopin.com,
however, in terms of skill-requirements, as described in the main text. Likewise, similar
patterns can be observed in the fractions of private and state-owned (or state-controlled)
enterprises. In terms of industry structure, the expansion of the IT and communications
sector is remarkable, while construction and transportation are less represented in our
data.
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Other industries
Note: Authors’ calculations using data collected from 51job.com during period May-November 2019. For
comparability, the vertical axis denotes absolute number of vacancy postings divided by period average.
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Note: Authors’ calculations using data collected from 51job.com during period May-November 2019 and
2016-information from China Statistical Yearbooks. All variables are expressed in logs and were standard-
ized have mean zero and a standard deviation of 1. Slope indicates estimated coefficient of bivariate linear
regression.
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Figure A.5: Distribution of education levels in Census and vacancy data
Note: Authors’ calculations using data collected from 51job.com (between May and November 2019) and
from China’s Population Censuses 2000-2015. Proportions in Census data are based on urban employed
population. Proportions in job vacancy data reflect requested minimum level of educational background.
Figure A.6: Distribution of employment (vacancies) across industries
(a) Employment (b) Firms
Note: Panel (a) benchmarks the 2019 industry distribution of job-ads from 51job.com against the industry
distribution of employment, according to the 2015 China Population Census. Panel (b) benchmarks the
2019 industry distribution of firms posting ads via 51job.com against the industry distribution of firms,
according to the 2018 China Economic Census.
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Table A.3: Cross-validation: sample means across data sources
Sample mean
51job (2019) Zhaopin (2008-10) Census (2005)
Wage distribution
1500 or lower (RMB/month) 0.000 0.145 0.778
1501-3000 0.027 0.164 0.176
3001-4000 0.105 0.214 0.021
4001-8000 0.485 0.244 0.022
8001 or higher 0.364 0.126 0.003
Education
High school or below 0.318 0.114 0.766
Some College 0.682 0.886 0.235
Firm ownership
Private sector 0.795 0.930 0.589
SOE and collectives 0.052 0.070 0.271
Industry
Primary, manufacturing and utility 0.432 0.267 0.453
Construction and transportation 0.068 0.135 0.118
IT and communication 0.299 0.185 0.016
Finance, insurance and real estate 0.013 0.052 0.063
Health, education and welfare 0.163 0.033 0.102
Trade, hospitality and entertainment 0.130 0.175 0.165
Public sector 0.034 0.000 0.060
Notes: The first column shows sample moments of our job vacancies sample based on 7 million
unique job IDs collected from 51job.com from May to November 2019. The second column is based
on the summary statistics from Kuhn and Shen (2013), who collected job ads posted on Zhaopin.com
for several periods during 2008 to 2010. The last column is calculated as a comparable sample by
Kuhn and Shen (2013). They pick eight highest-income provinces and get the statistics of urban em-
ployment from 2005 1% National Population Sample Survey.
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B Additional descriptive and summary statistics
B.1 Figures
Figure B.1: Monthly US merchandise trade with China, 2016-2019















































































Note: Authors’ calculations using data from USITC Dataweb. Shaded area indicates period when additional
discriminatory tariffs for China came into effect (i.e. since June 2018). Predictions based linear (or quadratic)
regression of monthly trade flows during years 2016 and 2017 to capture short-term pre-trade war trends
in the data. Vertical lines denote end of the year (i.e. December).
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Figure B.2: Number of sampled job vacancies and average wage offers across China
(a) Number of Job Vacancies (b) Annual Average Wage
Note: Authors’ calculations based on subsample of data downloaded from 51jobs.com which was matched
with firms reporting trade to China Customs for the year 2016. Panel (a) displays the total number of unique
job vacancies observed for those firms, across locations. Panel (b) displays the average wage offered in job
these vacancies across locations during the period May-November 2019.
Figure B.3: Skill Intensity: Industries Affected by US Tariffs on Chinese Products
(a) Distribution of Industry Skill Intensity (b) Industry Skill Intensity and Tariff Change
Note: Authors’ calculations based on tariff data from Fajgelbaum et al. (2020), Li (2018), and own updates.
Skill-intensity is measured as the industry-employment share of skilled workers in 2004, as documented in
the Annual Survey of Industry Production (ASIP).
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Figure B.4: Skill Intensity: Industries Affected by Chinese Tariffs on US Products
(a) Distribution of Industry Skill Intensity (b) Industry Skill Intensity and Tariff Change
Note: Authors’ calculations based on tariff data from Fajgelbaum et al. (2020), Li (2018), and own updates.
Skill-intensity is measured as the industry-employment share of skilled workers in 2004, as documented in
the Annual Survey of Industry Production (ASIP).
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B.2 Tables
Table B.1: Ten most hiring-intensive industries in matched customs data
Rank Industry name % of vacancies % of firms
1 Electronic technology / Semiconductor / Integrated circuit 11.52 10.27
2 Machinery / Equipment / Heavy industry 11.02 13.82
3 Pharmaceutical / Bioengineering 7.71 3.68
4 Automobile and Accessories 6.84 7.19
5 Trading / Import & Export 6.54 14.40
6 Fast moving consumer goods (food, beverages, cosmetics) 6.38 3.92
7 Medical equipment 4.95 3.75
8 Instrumentation / Industrial Automation 3.76 4.09
9 Apparel / Textile / Leather 3.67 4.55
10 Furniture / Home Appliances / Toys / Gifts 3.31 2.60
Cumulative (sum) 65.69 68.27
Note: Authors’ calculations based on data downloaded from 51job.com during the period May-November
2019 and matched firms reported in 2016 China Customs statistics. Industry names translated from de-
scription on 51job.com. Percentages represent industries’ share in total number of unique job-postings and
firms observed throughout the sample period.
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Table B.2: Hiring activity and job attributes by month, averages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Month (2019) May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov
Wage offer (10,000 RMB/year)
Average 9.58 9.74 10.14 9.88 10.71 10.53 10.41
Minimum 7.55 7.69 8.00 7.78 8.43 8.30 8.22
Maximum 11.60 11.79 12.29 11.98 12.99 12.75 12.60
Non-wage compensation (share of vacancies)
Subsidies 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.55 0.55 0.56
Bonus 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.49
Insurance package 0.72 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.72 0.71 0.71
Job requirements
Average work experience (years) 1.71 1.74 1.80 1.74 1.79 1.76 1.74
Minimum 1.53 1.56 1.61 1.56 1.59 1.57 1.56
Maximum 1.88 1.93 2.00 1.92 1.98 1.94 1.93
College or higher (fraction) 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.79 0.78 0.78
Number of firms 20,458 20,924 19,065 19,773 15,301 16,084 15,534
Number of unique jobs 232,000 258,058 199,334 197,929 146,535 153,711 141,982
Notes: Author’s calculations based on data collected from 51job.com and matched firms from China Custom
statistics. Monthly summary statistics reflect subsamples of aggregate summary statistics presented in main
text of the paper, featuring 30,123 firms and 607,532 unique job postings in the period May-November 2019.
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Table B.3: Average product and firm-level exposure to tariffs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)








Time (month-year) Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Jan 2018 0.036 0.102 0.092 0.069 0.029 0.038 0.058 0.043
Feb 2018 0.036 0.103 0.092 0.069 0.031 0.042 0.058 0.043
Mar 2018 0.036 0.103 0.092 0.069 0.031 0.042 0.058 0.043
Apr 2018 0.045 0.110 0.095 0.075 0.032 0.044 0.060 0.047
May 2018 0.045 0.110 0.095 0.075 0.032 0.044 0.059 0.047
Jun 2018 0.045 0.110 0.095 0.075 0.032 0.044 0.059 0.047
Jul 2018 0.074 0.129 0.095 0.100 0.095 0.099 0.059 0.060
Aug 2018 0.074 0.129 0.095 0.100 0.095 0.099 0.059 0.060
Sep 2018 0.084 0.139 0.104 0.110 0.117 0.125 0.078 0.085
Oct 2018 0.144 0.130 0.172 0.100 0.169 0.120 0.141 0.083
Nov 2018 0.144 0.130 0.167 0.098 0.169 0.120 0.138 0.081
Dec 2018 0.144 0.130 0.167 0.098 0.169 0.120 0.138 0.081
Jan 2019 0.144 0.130 0.166 0.097 0.169 0.120 0.136 0.078
Feb 2019 0.144 0.130 0.166 0.097 0.169 0.120 0.136 0.078
Mar 2019 0.144 0.130 0.166 0.097 0.169 0.120 0.136 0.078
Apr 2019 0.144 0.130 0.166 0.097 0.169 0.120 0.136 0.078
May 2019 0.232 0.151 0.166 0.097 0.247 0.141 0.136 0.078
Jun 2019 0.232 0.151 0.251 0.114 0.247 0.141 0.206 0.096
Jul 2019 0.232 0.151 0.251 0.114 0.247 0.141 0.206 0.096
Aug 2019 0.232 0.151 0.251 0.114 0.247 0.141 0.206 0.096
Sep 2019 0.232 0.151 0.251 0.114 0.247 0.141 0.206 0.096
Oct 2019 0.232 0.151 0.251 0.114 0.247 0.141 0.206 0.096
Nov 2019 0.232 0.151 0.251 0.114 0.247 0.141 0.206 0.096
Dec 2019 0.232 0.151 0.251 0.114 0.247 0.141 0.206 0.096
Notes: Authors’ calculations based on China Customs data from 2016 and tariff information from various
sources, as described in the main text. Columns (1)-(4) display average product level exposure (and stan-
dard deviations) to US tariffs and Chinese retaliation, observed at the 6-digit Harmonized Schedule (HS6)
level. Columns (5)-(8) display corresponding measure of firm-level exposure, as described in Section 4 of
the paper.
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Table B.4: Variable Description
Variable Description
Wage A numeric variable that captures the wage level (in 1000 US dollars) for
each job vacancy. In each job ad, the wage information is listed in the
format as a closed interval. We record two end points as the minimum
wage and maximum wage, respectively, and take the midpoint of the
interval as the mean wage.
Bonus An indicator variable that equals if employers commit to provide a per-
formance appraisal in addition to basic wage for a job.
Subsidy An indicator variable that equals to one if employers commit to pro-
vide overtime subsidies, transportation, communication, and meal al-
lowance for a job.
Insurance An indicator variable that equals to one if employers commit to provide
five insurances (unemployment, endowment, medial, work-related in-
jury and maternity) for a job.
College Degree Requirement An indicator variable that equals to one for jobs that require at least
a college degree. Employers choose from the following standardized
options the minimum level of education required for each job vacancy:
middle school, high school, (3 or 4 years) college degree, master degree,
and PhD degree.
Experience Requirement A numeric variable that captures the years of working experience re-
quired for each job vacancy. Employers choose from the following stan-
dardized options the years of working experience required for each job
vacancy: no experience needed, 1 year, 2 years, 3-4 years, 5-7 years, 8-
9 years, and 10 years or above. For each interval, we record two end
points and the midpoint as the minimum experience, maximum expe-
rience and mean experience, respectively. We record zero for the option
"no experience needed", and 10 the option "10 years or above".
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Table B.5: Descriptive Statistics by firms with varying length of Job Posting
Dep. variables Firm ownership Firm size













Mean 4.01 8.38 0.06 0.28 0.01 0.34
Std.Dev. 6.41 5.71
2-month firms: 5,597
Mean 4.10 8.52 0.05 0.32 0.01 0.27
Std.Dev. 7.25 5.58
3-month firms: 4,969
Mean 4.59 8.76 0.05 0.30 0.01 0.18
Std.Dev. 13.83 10.95
4-month firms: 4,110
Mean 4.56 8.92 0.06 0.30 0.02 0.11
Std.Dev. 8.20 9.04
5-month firms: 3,299
Mean 5.10 9.56 0.05 0.27 0.02 0.07
Std.Dev. 9.49 11.11
6-month firms: 2,536
Mean 6.09 9.78 0.05 0.26 0.02 0.04
Std.Dev. 11.10 6.65
7-month firms: 2,275
Mean 13.31 10.79 0.06 0.22 0.06 0.01
Std.Dev. 36.39 8.97
Notes: Author’s calculations based on data collected from 51job.com. Summary statistics for sample of
30,123 firms matched with China Customs information, May-November 2019. Vacancies are uniquely iden-
tified across months.
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Table B.6: Distribution of sampled Firms across Industries on 51job.com
Industry Classification Number of Firms (%)
Trading / Import & Export 14.40%
Machinery / Equipment / Heavy industry 13.82%
Electronic technology / Semiconductor / Integrated circuit 10.27%
Automobile and Accessories 7.19%
Apparel / Textile / Leather 4.55%
Instrumentation / Industrial Automation 4.09%
Fast moving consumer goods (food, beverages, cosmetics) 3.92%
Raw materials and processing 3.88%
Medical equipment 3.75%
Pharmaceutical / Bioengineering 3.68%
Petroleum / Chemical / Mineral / Geology 3.66%
Furniture / Home Appliances / Toys / Gifts 2.60%
Construction / Building Materials / Engineering 2.28%
Communication / Telecom / Network equipment 1.92%
Computer software 1.92%
Transportation and Logistics 1.92%
Wholesale and retail 1.73%




Diversified business group company 1.03%
Electrical / Electricity / Water conservancy 0.76%
Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fisheries 0.63%
Computer service (system, data service, maintenance) 0.61%
Medical / Nursing / Hygiene 0.56%
Office supplies and equipment 0.48%
Computer hardware 0.45%
Aerospace 0.44%
Home / Interior Design / Décor 0.43%
Testing and certification 0.37%
Finance / Investment / Securities 0.36%
Luxury / Collectibles / Crafts / Jewelry 0.34%
Entertainment / Leisure / Sports 0.27%
Hotel / Tourism 0.24%
Real estate 0.23%
Unclassified 0.21%
Professional services (consulting, human resources, accounting) 0.20%
Health & Beauty 0.16%
Academic research 0.14%
Education / Training / Institutions 0.14%
Extractive industry / Smelting 0.14%
Film / Media / Art / Culture Communication 0.11%
Catering 0.10%




Government / Public utility 0.03%
Rental service 0.03%
Outsourcing Service 0.03%
Media / Publishing 0.02%
Online game 0.02%
Insurance 0.02%




Notes: Table shows names of all 60 industry affiliations reported on the online job platform Qian Cheng Wu
You 51job.com. Next to industry names, we display the percentage of firms in our final sample that belong
to that industry.
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C Additional results and robustness checks
Table C.1: Offered wages, tariff exposure and educational background requirements
Dependent variable: average wage offer (1) (2)
ln(1 + TariffCHNft−1) 0.014 0.006
(0.046) (0.045)






Firm FE Y Y
City-Month FE Y Y
Sector-Month FE Y Y
Notes: Regression results based on job vacancy data observed between May and November 2019. Depen-
dent variable measures log average wage/salary offers advertised in firms’ vacancy postings. Column (1)
reproduces our main finding from column (6) in Table 3. Column (2) adds required college education as
an additional control variable. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at city-month level are displayed in
parentheses. Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table C.2: Number of vacancy postings and fictional tariff exposure, placebo estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Stock (all job vacancies) Flow (new job vacancies)
Number of vacancies (N vft) OLS Poisson OLS Poisson
ln(1 + T̃ariff
CHN
ft−1) -3.267 -0.219 -3.445 -0.162
(2.079) (0.203) (2.220) (0.270)
ln(1 + T̃ariff
US
ft−1) -1.801 -0.104 -3.993 -0.133
(1.724) (0.178) (2.624) (0.309)
Number of Boostraps 30 30 30 30
Firm FE Y Y Y Y
City-Month FE Y Y Y Y
Sector-Month FE Y Y Y Y
Notes: Table shows results of placebo regressions of vacancy postings, based on fictional tariff exposure and
a bootstrapped sample (see Section 5.2.1). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered a the city and month
level. Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table C.3: Wage offers and fictional tariff exposure, placebo estimation
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Wage/salary (lnwft) Minimum Maximum Average Dispersion
ln(1 + T̃ariff
CHN
ft−1) 0.009 0.020 0.017 0.011
(0.040) (0.042) (0.041) (0.018)
ln(1 + T̃ariff
US
ft−1) -0.017 -0.018 -0.017 -0.001
(0.033) (0.031) (0.031) (0.015)
Number of Boostraps 30 30 30 30
Firm FE Y Y Y Y
City-Month FE Y Y Y Y
Sector-Month FE Y Y Y Y
Notes: Table shows results of placebo regressions of advertised wage offers, based on fictional tariff expo-
sure and a bootstrapped sample (see Section 5.2.1). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered a the city
and month level. Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table C.4: Non-wage compensation and fictional tariff exposure, placebo estimation
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3)
Share of vacancies offering Bonuses Subsidies Insurances
ln(1 + T̃ariff
CHN




ft−1) -0.005 -0.014 -0.004
(0.028) (0.035) (0.029)
Number of Boostrap 30 30 30
Firm FE Y Y Y
City-Month FE Y Y Y
Sector-Month FE Y Y Y
Notes: Table shows results of placebo regressions of advertised non-wage compensation, based on fictional
tariff exposure and a bootstrapped sample (see Section 5.2.1). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered
a the city and month level. Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table C.5: Job requirements and fictional tariff exposure, placebo estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: College Previous work experience (years)
Fraction Minimum Average Maximum
ln(1 + T̃ariff
CHN
ft−1) 0.011 0.029 0.017 0.006
(0.040) (0.041) (0.167) (0.193)
ln(1 + T̃ariff
US
ft−1) 0.007 0.004 -0.005 -0.013
(0.034) (0.138) (0.161) (0.184)
Number of Boostrap 30 30 30 30
Firm FE Y Y Y Y
City-Month FE Y Y Y Y
Sector-Month FE Y Y Y Y
Notes: Table shows results of placebo regressions of advertised job requirements, based on fictional tariff
exposure and a bootstrapped sample (see Section 5.2.1). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered a the
city and month level. Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table C.6: Historical employment and wage growth in exposed firms, pre-trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable: Employment growth Avg. wage growth
∆TariffUSf,2018−2019 0.115* 0.043 0.061 0.071 -0.180*** -0.098 -0.086 -0.094
(0.062) (0.082) (0.082) (0.078) (0.067) (0.091) (0.094) (0.093)
∆TariffCHNf,2018−2019 -0.072 -0.046 -0.034 -0.053 0.084 0.059 0.051 0.066
(0.076) (0.089) (0.093) (0.097) (0.109) (0.111) (0.119) (0.118)
Observations 4,785 4,725 4,669 4,669 4,785 4,725 4,669 4,669
R-squared 0.001 0.076 0.129 0.147 0.002 0.072 0.123 0.131
Firm Control Y Y
City FE Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Note: Table shows cross-sectional firm-level regression results of employment and wage growth between
2012 and 2013. Growth measured as log-differences in employment and wage compensation per employee,
as reported for corresponding years in the ASIP. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering
at the city level. Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table C.7: Number of vacancies postings and tariff exposure, timing of effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Stock (all job vacancies) Flow (new job vacancies)
Number of vacancies (N vft) OLS OLS Poisson OLS OLS Poisson
ln(1 + TariffCHNft−1) -2.577 -2.317 0.097 -6.485** -6.307** 0.329
(2.516) (2.484) (0.268) (2.343) (2.408) (0.418)
ln(1 + TariffCHNft−3) -0.079 -0.349 0.547** -1.627*** -1.597*** 0.003
(1.615) (1.747) (0.222) (0.398) (0.271) (0.127)
ln(1 + TariffCHNft−5) -2.381** -2.223** -0.475*** -1.401*** -1.219** -0.963***
(0.895) (0.877) (0.149) (0.284) (0.380) (0.337)
ln(1 + TariffUSft−1) -2.275* -1.701** -0.223** -2.379* -5.729*** -0.540*
(1.092) (0.670) (0.104) (1.042) (1.308) (0.284)
ln(1 + TariffUSft−3) -0.379 -2.719* -0.336* 0.608 -0.695 -0.257
(1.275) (1.274) (0.181) (0.547) (0.447) (0.177)
ln(1 + TariffUSft−5) -2.467** -2.165* -0.299* -0.645* -0.227 0.097
(0.958) (1.006) (0.171) (0.301) (0.368) (0.426)
Observations 189,272 188,923 188,730 189,196 188,880 188,479
R-squared 0.763 0.767 0.522 0.537
City Controls Y Y
Month FE Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
City-Month FE Y Y Y Y
Sector-Month FE Y Y Y Y
Notes: Table shows fixed effects OLS and Poisson regression results for the number of vacancy postings by
firms over time, facing differential degrees of exposure to tariffs. Robust standard errors in parentheses are
adjusted for clustering at the city and month level (for FEOLS) and bootstrapped (for Poisson). Statistical
significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table C.8: Number of vacancy postings and exposure to tariffs (three-period lag)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Stock (all job vacancies) Flow (new job vacancies)
Number of vacancies (N vft) OLS OLS Poisson OLS OLS Poisson
ln(1 + TariffCHNft−3) -2.256 -2.259 0.432 -5.345** -5.147** -0.042
(2.193) (2.290) (0.328) (2.000) (1.976) (0.502)
ln(1 + TariffCHNft−3) -2.431 -4.499** -0.563** -0.690 -2.909 -0.502*
(1.422) (1.564) (0.227) (0.792) (1.779) (0.302)
Observations 189,272 188,909 188,705 189,196 188,880 188,479
R-squared 0.763 0.767 0.522 0.536
City Controls Y Y
Month FE Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
City-Month FE Y Y Y Y
Sector-Month FE Y Y Y Y
Notes: Table shows fixed effects OLS and Poisson regression results for the number of vacancy postings by
firms over time, facing differential degrees of exposure to tariffs. Robust standard errors in parentheses are
adjusted for clustering at the city and month level (for FEOLS) and bootstrapped (for Poisson). Statistical
significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table C.9: Wage offers and exposure to tariffs (three-period lag)
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Wage/salary lnwft Minimum Maximum Average Dispersion
ln(1 + TariffCHNft−3) -0.042 -0.049 -0.050 -0.060* -0.049 -0.058* -0.008 -0.011
(0.032) (0.036) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.022) (0.023)
ln(1 + TariffUSft−3) -0.046 -0.043 -0.047 -0.037 -0.045 -0.038 -0.001 0.006
(0.050) (0.056) (0.041) (0.049) (0.044) (0.051) (0.012) (0.011)
Observations 107,800 107,448 107,800 107,448 107,800 107,448 107,800 107,448
R-squared 0.738 0.742 0.732 0.736 0.734 0.738 0.736 0.740
City Controls Y Y Y Y
Month FE Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
City-Month FE Y Y Y Y
Sector-Month FE Y Y Y Y
Notes: Table shows fixed effects OLS regression results for offered wages in vacancy postings by firms over
time, facing differential degrees of exposure to tariffs. Robust standard errors in parentheses are adjusted
for clustering at the city and month level. Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table C.10: Non-wage compensation and exposure to tariffs (three-period lag)
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share of vacancies offering Bonus Subsidy Insurance
ln(1 + TariffCHNft−3) 0.002 0.008 0.015 0.024 0.034 0.043
(0.043) (0.042) (0.036) (0.033) (0.034) (0.032)
ln(1 + TariffUSft−3) 0.020 0.006 0.009 -0.020 0.015 0.002
(0.029) (0.027) (0.020) (0.013) (0.025) (0.029)
Observations 107,800 107,442 107,800 107,442 107,800 107,442
R-squared 0.855 0.857 0.863 0.865 0.864 0.866
City Controls Y Y Y
Month FE Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
City-Month FE Y Y Y
Sector-Month FE Y Y Y
Notes: Table shows fixed effects OLS regression results for prevalence of different forms of non-wage com-
pensation in vacancy postings by firms over time, facing differential degrees of exposure to tariffs. Robust
standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the city and month level. Statistical signifi-
cance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table C.11: Job requirements and exposure to tariffs (three-period lag)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable: Previous work experience (in years) College degree
Minimum Maximum Average Fraction
ln(1 + TariffCHNft−3) 0.052 0.110 0.038 0.115 0.045 0.113 -0.005 -0.006
(0.108) (0.126) (0.127) (0.154) (0.117) (0.139) (0.065) (0.062)
ln(1 + TariffUSft−3) -0.051 0.008 -0.037 0.035 -0.044 0.022 -0.023 0.008
(0.103) (0.098) (0.147) (0.143) (0.125) (0.120) (0.049) (0.046)
Observations 107,544 107,181 107,544 107,181 107,544 107,181 107,800 107,437
R-squared 0.745 0.748 0.744 0.748 0.745 0.749 0.712 0.716
City Controls Y Y Y Y
Month FE Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
City-Month FE Y Y Y Y
Sector-Month FE Y Y Y Y
Notes: Table shows fixed effects OLS regression results for job requirements specified in vacancy postings
by firms over time, facing differential degrees of exposure to tariffs. Robust standard errors in parentheses
are adjusted for clustering at the city and month level. Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table C.12: Effect of Tariffs by control groups
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Stock (all job vacancies) Flow (new job vacancies)
Number of vacancies (N vft) Control Group 1 Control Group 2 Control Group 1 Control Group 2
ln(1 + TariffCHNft−1) -2.555 -0.073 -6.998** -4.646**
(3.060) (2.879) (2.282) (1.660)
ln(1 + TariffUSft−1) -4.367** -2.925* -6.501*** -3.420*
(1.588) (1.473) (1.389) (1.591)
Observations 148,806 113,918 148,760 113,852
R-squared 0.735 0.727 0.448 0.451
Firm FE Y Y Y Y
City-Month Y Y Y Y
Ind-Month Y Y Y Y
Notes: Table shows fixed effects OLS regression results for the number of job vacancies posted by firms over
time, facing differential degrees of exposure to tariffs. Control group 1 reflects sample consisting of firms
directly affected by tariffs during 2019-round of trade war and unaffected firms that did not trade with the
US in base year 2016. Control group 2 reflects sample consisting of firms directly affected by tariffs during
2019-round of trade war and firms traded with the US in base year 2016 but were unaffected. Standard
errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at city and month level. Statistical significance: *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure C.1: Number of vacancy postings and tariff exposure by size of firms
(a) semi-elasticity
(b) ∆ln(Expected Counts)
Notes: Figures show coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals for regressions using different sub-
samples of firms, as indicated on the horizontal axis. Left panels indicate estimated effects of additional US
tariffs on respective outcome variables denoted in the title of the figure. Right panels indicate respectively
estimated effects of China’s retaliation tariffs in the trade war.
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Figure C.2: Average offered wages and tariff exposure by size of firms
Notes: Figures show coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals for regressions using different sub-
samples of firms, as indicated on the horizontal axis. Left panels indicate estimated effects of additional US
tariffs on respective outcome variables denoted in the title of the figure. Right panels indicate respectively
estimated effects of China’s retaliation tariffs in the trade war.
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Figure C.3: Offered non-wage compensation and tariff exposure by size of firms
(a) Share of Jobs Offering Bonus
(b) Share of Jobs Offering Subsidy
(c) Share of Jobs Offering Insurance
Notes: Figures show coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals for regressions using different sub-
samples of firms, as indicated on the horizontal axis. Left panels indicate estimated effects of additional US
tariffs on respective outcome variables denoted in the title of the figure. Right panels indicate respectively
estimated effects of China’s retaliation tariffs in the trade war.
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Figure C.4: Job requirements and tariff exposure by size of firms
(a) College Degree (or above)
(b) Work experience (years)
Notes: Figures show coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals for regressions using different sub-
samples of firms, as indicated on the horizontal axis. Left panels indicate estimated effects of additional US
tariffs on respective outcome variables denoted in the title of the figure. Right panels indicate respectively
estimated effects of China’s retaliation tariffs in the trade war.
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Figure C.5: Number of vacancy postings and tariff exposure by firm ownership
Notes: Figures show coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals for regressions using different sub-
samples of firms, as indicated on the horizontal axis. Left panels indicate estimated effects of additional US
tariffs on respective outcome variables denoted in the title of the figure. Right panels indicate respectively
estimated effects of China’s retaliation tariffs in the trade war.
64
Figure C.6: Average offered wages and tariff exposure by firm ownership
Notes: Figures show coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals for regressions using different sub-
samples of firms, as indicated on the horizontal axis. Left panels indicate estimated effects of additional US
tariffs on respective outcome variables denoted in the title of the figure. Right panels indicate respectively
estimated effects of China’s retaliation tariffs in the trade war.
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Figure C.7: Offered non-wage compensation and tariff exposure by firm ownership
(a) Share of Jobs Offering Bonus
(b) Share of Jobs Offering Subsidy
(c) Share of Jobs Offering Insurance
Notes: Figures show coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals for regressions using different sub-
samples of firms, as indicated on the horizontal axis. Left panels indicate estimated effects of additional US
tariffs on respective outcome variables denoted in the title of the figure. Right panels indicate respectively
estimated effects of China’s retaliation tariffs in the trade war.
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Figure C.8: Job requirements and tariff exposure by firm ownership
(a) College Degree (or above)
(b) Work experience (years)
Notes: Figures show coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals for regressions using different sub-
samples of firms, as indicated on the horizontal axis. Left panels indicate estimated effects of additional US
tariffs on respective outcome variables denoted in the title of the figure. Right panels indicate respectively
estimated effects of China’s retaliation tariffs in the trade war.
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Table C.13: Hiring behavior and exposure to tariffs, heterogeneous effects by firms’ prod-
uct mix and scope
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Labor demand Firms’ offers in vacancies Requirements in vacancies
Dependent variable: # of
vacancies





Panel A: Specialization in homogeneous goods
ln(1 + TariffCHNft−1) -6.988* -0.082 0.120** -0.011 0.077** 0.047 -0.030
(3.433) (0.062) (0.047) (0.062) (0.028) (0.050) (0.183)
ln(1 + TariffCHNft−1)× Share
imp,homo
f 6.225 0.214 -0.179 0.055 -0.162* 0.005 0.143
(5.702) (0.138) (0.108) (0.101) (0.069) (0.042) (0.396)
ln(1 + TariffUSft−1) -1.375 -0.019 0.039 0.053* 0.020 -0.051 -0.039
(1.654) (0.036) (0.020) (0.024) (0.031) (0.028) (0.121)
ln(1 + TariffUSft−1)× Share
exp,homo
f -7.306** -0.224** -0.008 -0.057 -0.034 0.051 0.238
(2.728) (0.067) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.036) (0.218)
Observations 131,614 74,967 74,967 74,967 74,967 74,967 74,771
R-squared 0.735 0.731 0.857 0.860 0.865 0.706 0.745
Panel B: Product scope in imports and exports
ln(1 + TariffCHNft−1) -6.383 0.012 0.079*** 0.038 0.036 0.010 -0.048
(3.368) (0.045) (0.021) (0.052) (0.033) (0.041) (0.150)
ln(1 + TariffCHNft−1)× 1im{small-scope} 11.556** 0.007 -0.060 -0.117 -0.048 0.046 0.259
(3.127) (0.076) (0.076) (0.072) (0.057) (0.037) (0.188)
ln(1 + TariffUSft−1) -3.827* -0.045 -0.000 0.008 0.005 -0.007 -0.129
(1.934) (0.040) (0.021) (0.015) (0.029) (0.024) (0.094)
ln(1 + TariffUSft−1)× 1ex{small-scope} -0.650 -0.075* 0.064** 0.032 0.012 -0.096** 0.394*
(2.511) (0.039) (0.026) (0.030) (0.040) (0.034) (0.184)
Observations 188,930 107,424 107,424 107,424 107,424 107,424 107,168
R-squared 0.767 0.738 0.857 0.865 0.867 0.716 0.749
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
City-Month Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sector-Month Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Table shows differential effects of tariff exposure during the trade war on different indicators of labor
demand and hiring behavior, conditional on their product mix and diversification in trade. Panel A con-
siders the measure of product differentiation from Rauch (1999) and uses the share of homogeneous goods
in firms’ import and export baskets, respectively, in 2016. Panel B considers diversification as the number
of goods a firm exports or imports. Ranking firms according to this measure revealed from 2016 trade data,
we consider the bottom third of the distribution as “small-scope" firms. All regressions include fixed effects
as indicated at the bottom of the table. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the city
and month level. Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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